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Shared Understanding or Consensus-Masked 
Disagreement? The Anti-Torture Framework 
in the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
JANET E. LORD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD or Convention)1 offers an opportunity to assess both 
the state of international human rights law generally and the progressive 
development of the international anti-torture framework in particular. 
As a core international human rights convention, and the first to be 
adopted in the twenty-first century, its constellation of civil, political, 
economic, social, and cultural rights offers a window through which to 
view human rights law in the context of disability, including the 
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment or punishment.2 The Convention was opened for signature on 
 
* Research Associate, Harvard Law School Project on Disability; Senior Partner, BlueLaw 
International LLP; and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The 
author participated in all of the negotiating sessions during the drafting of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and thus drew upon that experience in the development of this 
Article. I am grateful to Michael Stein, Julie Mertus, and Jan Fiala for their insightful comments 
and dialogue with me on earlier drafts. I dedicate this Article to my mother, Margaret Lord, an 
intrepid human rights promoter. 
 1. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter CRPD]. The Convention was adopted by consensus by 
the General Assembly on December 13, 2006, together with its Optional Protocol. Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007). 
 2. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. For an overview of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, see Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Process, Substance and Prospects, in 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 495, 495–
514 (Felipe Gomez Isa & Koen De Feyter eds., 2009) [hereinafter Process, Substance and 
Prospects]. 
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March 30, 2007, and entered into force on May 3, 2008.3 The CRPD 
provisions that are closely linked to physical and mental integrity, in 
particular Article 12 on legal capacity, have attracted reservations and 
interpretive declarations by ratifying States.4 This calls into question the 
depth of consensus on the anti-torture framework in its disability-
specific application. Notwithstanding some unsettled questions as to the 
specific circumstances falling within the torture prohibition in the 
CRPD,5 it represents a significant development that should not be lost 
on scholars and practitioners.  
Following this introduction, Part II of this article describes the 
particular disability context wherein the CRPD anti-torture framework 
is placed, namely, the prevalence of violence against persons with 
disabilities and its particularized manifestations. Next, Part III reviews 
the general human rights law prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, and charts the development of 
disability-specific standards relating to the anti-torture framework prior 
to the adoption of the CRPD. Part IV analyzes the normative landscape 
against which the CRPD text was negotiated as well as the anti-torture 
provisions more specifically. Part V addresses State duties to protect, 
respect, and fulfill the right of persons with disabilities to be free from 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or 
punishment, noting areas of agreement as well as disagreement. It also 
considers issues of specific relevance to persons with disabilities, 
including conditions of detention or imprisonment, the use of restraints 
and seclusion, compulsory treatment, private acts constituting torture or 
other abuse, punishment, and duties to protect. Part VI addresses the 
gender implications of the torture prohibition, focusing in particular on 
women and girls with disabilities. Finally, Part VII analyzes a largely 
disregarded issue, namely, the implications of Article 15 of the CRPD 
with regard to expulsion and extradition within the context of disability. 
The article concludes by charting suggested implications for both 
scholarship and human rights advocacy around the torture prohibition. It 
also puts forward suggestions as to how the CRPD, through its treaty 
 
 3. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang 
=en (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) [hereinafter U.N.T.S. Website]. Notably, the CRPD received the 
greatest number of signatures of any human rights treaty on its opening signature day and is the 
second most rapidly ratified of the core human rights conventions. See Latest Updates, DISABLED 
PEOPLES’ INT’L (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.icrpd.net/ratification/en/updateFiles/2007-04-09.pdf. 
 4. See U.N.T.S. Website, supra note 3. 
 5. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
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monitoring body, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, the periodic Conference of States Parties and other 
institutional arrangements (regional and international), can continue to 
foment the progressive development and direction of the anti-torture 
framework and foster deeper normative consensus and shared 
understanding around the meaning of Article 15. 
II.  CONTEXTUALIZING THE TORTURE PROHIBITION TO ADDRESS 
DISABILITY RIGHTS 
A.  Violations of Physical and Mental Integrity Against Persons with 
Disabilities 
Disability discrimination, including the failure to reasonably 
accommodate persons with disabilities, frequently manifests in 
violations of physical and mental integrity, making disability a risk 
factor when considering vulnerability to torture and other forms of 
inhuman or degrading treatment.6 Violations against people with 
disabilities may go unnoticed, particularly where they take place in 
institutionalized settings or other places that are similarly isolated and 
shielded from scrutiny.7 In many parts of the world, persons with 
disabilities are still subjected to long-term and even permanent 
institutionalization in psychiatric facilities and social care homes, 
frequently in isolated environs within rural areas or locations set apart 
from established communities.8 In other cases, persons with disabilities 
are isolated not in institutional settings, but in their own homes and 
 
 6. See Special Rapporteur on Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Interim Report, ¶¶ 37–76, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008) (by Manfred Nowak) 
[hereinafter Nowak Interim Report]; see also Report of the Office of the High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Expert Seminar on Freedom from Torture and Ill-Treatment and Persons with 
Disabilities (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/torture/seminar 
torturereportfinal.doc [hereinafter OCHR Report]. 
 7. Disability Rights International (DRI) (formerly Mental Disability Rights International 
(MDRI)) has documented egregious human rights violations against person with disabilities in 
institutional settings, such as orphanages, social care homes, and psychiatric hospitals. See 
MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH:  MEXICO 13–41 
(2000); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, CHILDREN IN RUSSIA’S INSTITUTIONS:  HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 10–23 (1999) [hereinafter MDRI RUSSIA REPORT]; 
MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH:  HUNGARY (1997) 
[hereinafter MDRI HUNGARY REPORT], available at http://www.mdri.org/PDFs/reports/Hungary. 
pdf; MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH:  URUGUAY 16–48 
(1995). 
 8. See Debra Benko & Brittany Benowitz, The Application of Universal Human Rights 
Law to People with Mental Disabilities, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 11 (2001). 
  
30 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 33:27 
communities with little or no opportunity to interact with their peers, 
receive an education, pursue economic opportunities, or otherwise 
engage in community life.9 
In many countries, the living conditions associated with the 
institutionalization of persons with disabilities not only represent 
serious barriers to the enjoyment of economic, social, and political 
inclusion, but constitute life-threatening situations, with inadequate food 
and shelter and unacceptable hygiene that presents high risks of 
infectious diseases.10 The work of one international disability rights 
organization in Armenia, for example, disclosed a thirty percent annual 
mortality rate in one particular social care institution, an exceedingly 
high death rate that cannot be explained away by reference to disability-
related causes.11 In other cases, practices that purport to “treat” or 
“protect” persons with disabilities in institutions are dangerous, not to 
mention degrading and undignified. Human rights documentation by the 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) based in Hungary 
disclosed the use of cage beds in Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia as a form of restraint in facilities warehousing 
children with disabilities.12 
Persons with disabilities are likely to live in poverty, a condition 
that exposes women and girls with disabilities in particular to sexual 
exploitation, with research suggesting that a large percentage will 
experience sexual assault or abuse during their lifetime.13 Sexual 
violence is also a major tool of warfare, often perpetrated against 
women and girls, resulting in psycho-social and physical disability.14 
Women and girls with disabilities, as well as persons with intellectual 
disabilities, are at particularly high risk for violence and sexual abuse 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 10. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CTR., CAGE BEDS:  INHUMAN AND DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT IN FOUR EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES 36–41 (2003), 
http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Cage%20Beds.pdf [hereinafter MDAC CAGE BEDS 
REPORT].  The use of cage beds has since been discontinued in Hungary and Slovenia. 
 13. See U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & 
UNITED NATIONS AIDS, DISABILITY AND HIV POLICY BRIEF 2–3 (2009), available at 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Manual/2009/jc1632_pol_brief_disability_long_en.pdf [hereinafter 
DISABILITY AND HIV POLICY BRIEF]; see also Nora Ellen Groce & Reshma Trasi, Rape of 
Individuals with Disability:  AIDS and the Folk Belief of Virgin Cleansing, 363 LANCET 1663, 
1663–64 (2004). 
 14. See Jennifer Park, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War in International Humanitarian 
Law, 3/1 INT’L PUB. POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2007), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/ 
downloads/vol3-1/Park.pdf. 
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when confined to institutions15 and often experience multi-dimensional 
discrimination in many countries due to discrimination on the basis of 
both gender and disability.16 Disability Rights International (DRI) 
reported that women who survived violence and trauma in Kosovo were 
improperly detained in institutions because women with psychiatric 
diagnoses are excluded from community services.17  
Children with disabilities are likewise at risk for mistreatment and 
abuse in institutionalized settings such as orphanages,18 social care 
homes and schools,19 and in their homes and communities. Some 
particularly egregious cases of abuse have been well documented, while 
others go unnoticed and unaddressed. In Russia, for example, DRI 
reported that there were some 400,000 to 600,000 children who were 
institutionalized, many of whom were children with disabilities, and 
others who were at high risk of acquiring a disability due to their 
conditions of institutionalization.20 The practices of psychiatry to 
advance Soviet governmental interests is well documented and involved 
sweeping psychiatric commitment procedures that subjected persons 
with psycho-social disabilities as well as others, including political 
 
 15. DISABILITY AND HIV POLICY BRIEF, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
 16. See Nora Ellen Groce, HIV/AIDS and Individuals with Disability, 8 HEALTH & HUM. 
RTS. 215, 217 (2005), available at http://www.hhrjournal.org/archives-pdf/4065341.pdf. 
bannered.pdf; NORA ELLEN GROCE ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITY IN HIV/AIDS OUTREACH EFFORTS 3–4 (2006), available at http://globalsurvey.med. 
yale.edu/inclusion_guidelines_hivaids.pdf; NORA ELLEN GROCE ET AL., HIV/AIDS AND 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITY 10, 12–13, 28 (2004), available at http://www.dpi.org/files/ 
uploads/hiv/Health%20and%20Human%20Rights%20-%20Published%20version.pdf 
[hereinafter HIV/AIDS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITY]. 
 17. See MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, NOT ON THE AGENDA:  HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN KOSOVO 13–15 (2002), available at http://www.mdri.org 
/PDFs/reports/KosovoReport.pdf [hereinafter MDRI KOSOVO REPORT]. 
 18. See, e.g., MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, HIDDEN SUFFERING:  ROMANIA’S 
SEGREGATION AND ABUSE OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.mdri.org/PDFs/reports/romania-May%209%20final_with%20photos.pdf; MENTAL 
DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS:  HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE 
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES, ORPHANAGES AND REHABILITATION CENTERS OF TURKEY 24–25 
(2005), available at http://www.mdri.org/PDFs/reports/turkey%20final%209-26-05.pdf; MDRI 
RUSSIA REPORT, supra note 7. 
 19. See generally MARK C. WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT (2007). 
 20. MDRI RUSSIA REPORT, supra note 7. “Under the Russian discipline of defectology, 
children are seen as having defects that need to be corrected rather than disabilities that should be 
accommodated within their communities. Officials report that at least 20 percent of 
institutionalized children with mental disabilities are permanently confined with physical 
restraints to their beds in ‘lying down’ rooms and given no treatment. Furthermore, children are 
severely undernourished and either overmedicated or not provided with needed medication.” 
Benko & Benowitz, supra note 8, at 10. 
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prisoners and dissidents, to years of confinement and isolation, in 
addition to other abuses.21 More recently, DRI has found egregious 
abuses in U.S. facilities, with electric shocks administered via 
backpacks strapped onto children with disabilities perpetrated in the 
guise of legitimate behavior modification “therapy.”22 
Protecting the physical and mental integrity of persons with 
disabilities is an essential component of any disability-specific human 
rights strategy and formed the basis of one of the central—as well as 
most controversial—dialogues during the drafting of the CRPD. 
Ultimately, the CRPD anti-torture framework offers human rights 
organizations the opportunity to improve and redress their historical 
neglect of egregious abuses against persons with disabilities, and to 
underscore disability rights obligations under human rights law for 
governments. 
B.  The Torture Prohibition as a Rule of Special Character in Human 
Rights Law 
The prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment is a rule of special character in international 
human rights law:  it is reflected in a host of international instruments,23 
 
 21. See Dennis Ougrin et al., Psychiatry in Post-Communist Ukraine:  Dismantling the Past, 
Paving the Way for the Future, 30 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 456, 456–58 (2006), available at http://pb 
.rcpsych.org/cgi/reprint/30/12/456.pdf; Amy Young-Anawaty, International Human Rights 
Norms and Soviet Abuse of Psychiatry, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 785, 785–89 (1978); Victoria 
Rood, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment:  An International Human Rights Issue, 9 CAL. 
W. INT’L L.J. 629, 629–30 (1979). 
 22. See MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, TORTURE NOT TREATMENT:  ELECTRIC SHOCK 
AND LONG-TERM RESTRAINT IN THE UNITED STATES ON CHILDREN AND ADULTS WITH 
DISABILITIES AT THE JUDGE ROTENBERG CENTER 1–3, 12–13 (2010), available at http://www. 
mdri.org/PDFs/USReportandUrgentAppeal.pdf [hereinafter MDRI ROTENBERG CENTER 
REPORT] (documenting human rights abuses in a U.S. institution in Massachusetts where children 
and adults were routinely subjected to electric shock, receiving multiple skin shocks on their legs, 
arms, hands, feet, fingers, and torsos for non-compliance such as getting out of their seats, 
making noises, swearing, or failing to follow staff directions, where they were also subjected to 
other punishments such as food deprivation and mock stabbings). 
 23. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(I)(a), (c), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War art. 3(I)(a), (c), 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. For additional sources of international 
humanitarian and criminal law relevant to protection against violations of physical and mental 
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including a specialized convention on the subject;24 it is a human rights 
rule from which no derogation is permitted; and it is subject to no 
restriction or limitation.25 As such, it must be regarded as having 
attained the status of customary international law and, moreover, there 
is ample authority for the proposition that the prohibition of torture has 
acquired the status of a peremptory norm of international law according 
to which it may be assigned jus cogens status.26  
 
integrity, see Andrew Byrnes, Torture and Other Offenses Involving the Violation of Physical and 
Mental Integrity of the Human Person, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 214, 226–27 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-
Goldman eds., 2000).  
 24. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]. 
 25. This applies equally to the prohibition of scientific experimentation absent informed 
consent, which is regarded as a component of the torture prohibition. Manfred Nowak’s 
proposition that reservations to Article 7 of the ICCPR are contrary to the object and purpose of 
the Covenant owing to the special character of the torture proscription in international law is a 
sound one, and would also apply to reservations in respect of Article 15 of the CRPD. MANFRED 
NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:  CCPR COMMENTARY 126 (1993); 
see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May. 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 
(prohibiting a State from entering a reservation to a treaty, inter alia, where the “reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”). 
 26. The jus cogens status of the torture prohibition has been recognized by the Committee 
against Torture, the treaty body that monitors the Convention against Torture, and provides 
authoritative interpretations of CAT obligations. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:  General 
Comment No. 2:  Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 
(Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment No. 2]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) (identifying torture as an 
illustrative example of a jus cogens norm, along with piracy, genocide, and the slave trade); 
NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 67–74 (2d ed., 
1999); Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 122, 
122 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). Judge Higgins, in discussing the legal character of the UDHR, 
states:  “[T]he suggestion has been made that human rights treaties have the character of jus 
cogens. There certainly exists a consensus that certain rights—the right to life, to freedom from 
slavery or torture—are so fundamental that no derogation to them is permissible. And 
international human rights treaties undoubtedly contain elements that are binding as principles 
which are recognized by civilized States, and not only as mutual treaty commitments.” Rosalyn 
Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 281, 282 (1978). 
The ruling in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala is at least suggestive in this regard:  “Among the rights 
universally proclaimed by all nations . . . is the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed for the 
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2nd 
Cir. 1980); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel Derby, An Appraisal of Torture in 
International Law and Practice:  The Need for an International Convention for the Prevention 
and Suppression of Torture, 48 REV. INT’L DROIT PENAL 17, 67–88 (1977) (arguing that all four 
sources of international law—treaties, customs, general principles recognized by all civilized 
nations, and the writings of noted publicists—proscribe torture). 
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Notwithstanding its stature in international human rights law, its 
persistence as a frequently violated right27 has given rise to a number of 
successive efforts to eradicate widespread torture practices through 
standard-setting, institution-building, and programmatic interventions 
engaging a wide range of State and non-State actors.28 An extensive 
jurisprudence has developed, providing guidance to the contours of the 
international prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Cases specifically relevant for 
persons with disabilities are reflected in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR)29 and the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights,30 as well as in credible and well-documented reports 
of human rights abuses by leading international human rights 
organizations31 and in studies issued by the United Nations.32 Notably, 
 
 27. For example, in a 2009 report, Amnesty International surveyed various States that 
violate international law prohibitions against torture. See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2009:  THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS (2009), available 
at http://report2009.amnesty.org/sites/report2009.amnesty.org/files/documents/air09-en.pdf. 
 28. See generally General Comment No. 2, supra note 26, at 2–4; AMNESTY INT’L, supra 
note 27, at 369–89 (obligating States to take actions to reinforce the prohibition against torture 
through legislative, administrative, judicial, and other actions to prevent it); see also Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 17, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter CPHRFF] (forbidding any State, group, or person from engaging in any 
activity that would destroy any rights and freedoms both in an beyond the convention). 
 29. See, e.g., Keenan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, ¶¶ 27–
40 (2001). For a review of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and mental 
disability, see Oliver Lewis, Protecting the Rights of People with Mental Disabilities:  The 
European Convention on Human Rights, 9 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 293, 294–316 (2002); European 
Comm. for the Prevention of Torture & Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report 
on Visit to Romania, Ref. CPT/Inf(98)5, COUNCIL OF EUROPE ¶ 177 (Feb. 19, 1998), 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/rom/1998-05-inf-fra-1.htm (reporting on sixty-two deaths at 
the Poiana Mare Psychiatric Institution, of which twenty-five were attributed to severe protein 
and calorific malnutrition); Report to the Bulgarian Government on the Visit to Bulgaria Carried 
Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Doc. CPT/Inf ¶ 174 & n.16 (Jan. 28, 2002) (reporting deaths at the 
Terter Social Care Home, including causes attributable to asphyxia and hypothermia). 
 30. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2003, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 ¶ 60 (2004); Congo 
v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 63/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, 
doc. 6 rev. ¶ 59 (1999). 
 31. See generally MDRI JUDGE ROTENBERG CENTER REPORT, supra note 22, at 1; Press 
Release, Amnesty Int’l, Bulgaria:  Disabled Women Condemned to ‘Slow Death’ (Oct. 10, 2001) 
(on file with author), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR15/002/2001/en/ 
02db7d67-d8d7-11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c118e/eur150022001en.pdf; MENTAL DISABILITY 
ADVOCACY CTR., LIBERTY DENIED:  MENTAL DISABILITY DETENTION IN HUNGARY 8 (2004), 
available at http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Liberty%20Denied.pdf. 
 32. See, e.g., LEANDRO DESPOUY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS ¶¶ 179–82 
(United Nations 1993), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dispaperdes0.htm. 
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the failure of mainstream human rights practice to account for the 
violations of the torture prohibition against persons with disabilities, 
particularly against persons with disabilities in institutional settings, led 
to the development of a niche human rights practice genre33 and served 
as an impetus for drafters of the CRPD to ensure its coverage in the 
treaty.34 
III.  THE GENERAL PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
The point of departure for addressing the prohibition of torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in contemporary 
human rights law is Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR),35 which states:  “No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”36 Article 7 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)37 
reaffirms this prohibition, adopting the same language. It also adds an 
explicit reference to scientific experimentation in a second sentence that 
reads:  “In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent 
to medical or scientific experimentation”—a standard first set forth in 
the Nuremberg Code and notably without exception or permissible 
derogation.38 
Regional human rights conventions similarly reflect the prohibition 
against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
 
 33. The founding of the Mental Disability Rights International organization was the direct 
result of the failure of Human Rights Watch (HRW) to include disability rights in its agenda, a 
fact that was readily acknowledged by the Executive Director of HRW at the beginning of the 
CRPD process. See MDRI KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 17, at 22. The work of Mental Disability 
Advocacy Centre (MDAC) in Budapest is also of particular note and has resulted in successful 
strategic litigation before the European Court of Human Rights and credible documenting and 
reporting. See Press Release, Mental Disability Advocacy Ctr., Why Must People with 
Disabilities Turn to the European Court of Human Rights for Protection? (Aug. 23, 2007), 
available at http://mdac.info/MEDIA+RELEASE+23.08.2007. Also, note that mainstream human 
rights organizations, including both HRW and Amnesty International, focused on the horrific 
conditions of detention among political prisoners while ignoring the very same conditions 
imposed on persons with disabilities. See Janet E. Lord, Disability Rights and the Human Rights 
Mainstream, in THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR NEW HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (Clifford Bob ed., 
2009). 
 34. See CRPD, supra note 1, annex I(k). 
 35. See UDHR, supra note 23, art. 5. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7. 
 38. Id. 
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punishment as generally articulated in the ICCPR formulation without 
the explicit reference to medical or scientific experimentation.39 
Notably, the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 
recognizes within a single article (Article 5) the right of the individual 
“to have his physical, mental and moral integrity respected” along with 
the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment. This article formed the basis of arguments in 
favor of a similar formulation in the CRPD.40 
Of additional relevance are those non-binding but authoritative 
standards and guidelines that have been adopted at the international 
level in an effort to guide State conduct in the eradication of torture. 
These include, for example, the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners,41 the Code of Conduct for Law-Enforcement 
Officials,42 the Principles of Medical Ethics,43 and the Body of 
 
 39. See CPHRFF, supra note 28, art. 3. Trenchantly, during the negotiation of the European 
Convention, the British representative proposed amending the text to make the torture provision 
considerably more detailed such that (1) torture would be recognized as a crime against humanity; 
(2) torture would never be justified under any circumstances; (3) the prohibition would 
encompass any kind of torture, even that carried out by “private organizations”; (4) the 
prohibition would extend to beating, “imprisonment with such an excess of light, darkness, noise 
or silence as to cause mental suffering,” as well as to mutilation and sterilization; and (5) no 
person shall “be forced to take drugs nor shall they be administered to him without his knowledge 
and consent.” 2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” 
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2–4 (1975). The detailed proposal was 
eventually withdrawn, not on the basis that such conduct was permissible, but rather that singling 
out specific instances of torture whilst excluding others would undermine the scope of the 
prohibition. A leading commentator has concluded that the resulting Article was intended by the 
drafters of the ECHR to constitute “a very sweeping ban, so broad as to embrace all the forms of 
torture or inhuman treatment” included in the proposal of the British representative. A. Cassese, 
Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 225, 228 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 
1993); Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of American States, Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Sept. 12, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 
519; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 5, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. 
 40. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 39, art. 5; see also Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 39, art. 2. 
 41. See Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Adopted by the First 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Held at 
Geneva in 1955, and Approved by the Economic and Social Council by its Resolution 663 C 
(XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977 (Aug. 30, 1955), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/treatmentprisoners.pdf (providing in Rule 3:  “Corporal 
punishment, punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishments shall be completely prohibited as punishments for disciplinary offences.”). 
 42. See Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, art. 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979) (“No law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or 
tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may 
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Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment.44 
In 1984, the United Nations adopted a specialized convention on 
the subject, the Convention against Torture,45 that provided a definition 
of torture—inclusive of torture based on discrimination “of any 
kind”46—and establishes an implementation mechanism, including a 
Committee against Torture, serving as a treaty monitoring body 
endowed with the functions of considering State reports, reviewing 
individual and inter-State communications, and undertaking confidential 
inquiries.47 In 1985, the Human Rights Commission established a 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment48 mandated to investigate allegations of 
torture in all countries and authorized to issue reports which provide 
supplemental means of interpreting the nature and scope of the 
 
any law enforcement official invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state 
of war or a threat of war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”). 
 43. See Principles of Medical Ethics, G.A. Res. 37/194, principle 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982) (“It is a gross contravention of medical ethics, as well as an 
offence under applicable international instruments, for health personnel, particularly physicians, 
to engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute participation in, complicity in, 
incitement to or attempts to commit torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”). 
 44. See Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/bodyprinciples.pdf. 
 45. See CAT, supra note 24.  
 46. The Convention Against Torture defines torture as: 
“[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incident to lawful sanctions.” Id. art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 47. For the work of the Committee against Torture, see U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 17, The Committee Against Torture, 2–5 (Jan. 1992), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4794773d2.html. 
 48. The Special Rapporteur was appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights in Resolution 1985/33, and is mandated to examine questions pertaining to torture in 
consideration of all countries, irrespective of whether a State has ratified the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/ 
torture/rapporteur/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
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prohibition, a mandate that continues under the Commission’s successor 
body, the Human Rights Council.49 In 2008, the Special Rapporteur 
released a report that, among other things, detailed the application of the 
prohibition against torture and other forms of ill-treatment in relation to 
persons with disabilities.50 
The foregoing review highlights the CRPD as one of many 
international human rights instruments and mechanisms designed to 
address and eradicate torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
Disability-specific instruments provide additional guidance on matters 
pertaining to the physical and mental integrity of persons with 
disabilities. In particular, the Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (MI 
Principles) affirm the right of persons with psycho-social disabilities to 
“be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person.”51 The MI Principles further provide that “[a]ll persons 
with a mental illness, or who are being treated as such persons, have the 
right to protection from economic, sexual and other forms of 
exploitation, physical or other abuse and degrading treatment”52 and that 
“medication . . . shall never be administered as a punishment or for the 
convenience of others.”53 
Other MI provisions are decidedly less enlightened; for example, 
certain MI provisions pitch against facilitating individual choice and 
autonomy in decisions regarding an individual’s right to refuse to take 
medication.54 As Gendreau emphasizes, “far from recognizing the lay 
character of the decision to accept or to refuse a treatment, these 
Principles consecrate a particular medical approach to human rights.”55 
Notably, the MI Principles recognize a limited right to refuse treatment 
or to stop treatment, and in so doing require that “[t]he consequences of 
 
 49. Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶¶ 3, 5(g), (i)–(j), U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/251 
(Apr. 3, 2006). 
 50. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, at 2. 
 51. The Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health 
Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, principle 1.2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/119 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter MI 
Principles]. For more on the MI Principles, see Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, Human 
Rights Advocacy Under the “Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness,” 16 
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993). 
 52. MI Principles, supra note 51, principle 1.3. 
 53. Id. principle 10.1. 
 54. Id. arts. 6–8, 13, 15. 
 55. Caroline Gendreau, The Rights of Psychiatric Patients in the Light of the Principles 
Announced by the United Nations:  A Recognition of the Right to Consent to Treatment?, 20 
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 259, 276 (1997). 
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refusing or stopping treatment must be explained to the patient.”56 This 
perspective and its terminology—rights-holder qua “patient”—
implicitly reinforces power differentials and undermines the notion that 
persons with psycho-social disabilities are rights-holders like all other 
human beings.57 This view is so anathema to certain segments of the 
disability community, notably anti-psychiatry/survivor advocates, that 
the MI Principles have been wholly discarded, even as a guide to more 
progressive disability rights framings in the CRPD.58  
In keeping with the insights of Celia Albin and others that norms 
act as “external referents,”59 the MI Principles were a lightning rod for 
the survivor community, whose advocates emphasized their 
shortcomings and discredited their relevance in order to add normative 
value to their own claims.60 This served to constrain dialogue in 
significant ways, for example, limiting discussion of those aspects of 
the MI Principles that some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
regarded as essential safeguards that could be usefully reflected in the 
CRPD text.61 
 
 56. MI Principles, supra note 51, principle 11.4. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, Submission to the United 
Nations Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive & Integral International Convention to Promote 
& Protect the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, pmbl. (2003), 
http://un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/contrib-wnusp.htm [hereinafter WNUSP Position] 
(asserting that the MI Principles do not reflect international human rights standards and should 
not be regarded as a legitimate instrument). For an explanation of the divergence of opinion on 
the MI Principles, see Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? 
Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 
(2008). As Kayess and French accurately note, the International Disability Caucus (IDC), in its 
advocacy position on the CRPD preambular language, sought to omit any mention of the MI 
Principles as historical antecedents of the CRPD among two other earlier instruments. These 
omissions “were intensely pursued by the IDC, which sought to negate any relationship between 
these instruments and the CRPD, and thereby to limit any future reliance upon them for the 
purposes of interpreting and applying CRPD rights. The IDC’s objections were focused on these 
instruments’ perceived derivation from the medical model and their approval or acceptance of 
institutionalization, substitute decision-making, and the compulsory treatment of persons with 
disability.” Id. at 24–25. 
 59. See CECILIA ALBIN, JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 228 
(2001). 
 60. For more on this fraught and embittered advocacy between anti-psychiatry survivors and 
those adopting a alternative perspective, see Janet E. Lord, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:  Voice 
Accountability and NGOs in Human Rights Standard Setting, 5 SETON HALL J. DIPL. & INT’L 
REL. 93, 100–01 (2004). 
 61. NGOs such as DRI routinely invoke the MI Principles in human rights reporting, in 
particular the procedural safeguards reflected therein that serve as checks on the arbitrary 
decision-making of mental health professionals. See also OCHR Report, supra note 6, at 6–8 
(discussing the importance of the CRPD as a means to prevent forced psychiatric intervention).  
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Other disability-specific instruments set the foundation for the 
development of the CRPD and serve to highlight threats to the physical 
and mental integrity of persons with disabilities. For example, the 
World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons, adopted in 
1982,62 recognizes the issue of violence and torture as a cause of 
disability and emphasizes the importance of taking action to prevent 
such violence.63 The Standard Rules on the Equalization of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, adopted in 1993,64 were 
formulated along with the World Programme in lieu of a disability-
specific treaty; however, these rules failed to fully address civil rights, 
such as the right to be free from torture, which served as the primary 
disability-specific touchstone during negotiations on the CRPD anti-
torture provisions.65 
Finally, international humanitarian law also provides a repository 
of rules pertaining specifically to the prohibition of torture and ill-
treatment and offers disability-specific guidance in certain instances, 
although within a decidedly paternalistic model of protection.66 
 
 62. World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 37/52, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/37/52 (Dec. 3, 1982). 
 63. See UNITED NATIONS, WORLD PROGRAMME OF ACTION CONCERNING DISABLED 
PERSONS ¶ 49, available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/united%20nations 
/world%20programme.pdf (“Victims of torture who have been disabled physically or mentally, 
not by accident of birth or normal activity, but by the deliberate infliction of injury, form another 
group of disabled persons.”); see also id. ¶ 168 (“Incidents of gross violation of basic human 
rights, including torture, can be a cause of mental and physical disability. The Commission on 
Human Rights should give consideration, inter alia, to such violations for the purpose of taking 
appropriate ameliorative action.”). Note, however, that the World Programme of Action, adopted 
in 1982, is very much a product of its time because it conflates disability rights with disability 
prevention and often echoes a decidedly medical model approach. 
 64. Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, G.A. 
Res. 48/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/96 (Mar. 4, 1994). 
 65. See id. As mentioned in note 58, supra, earlier soft law instruments adopted during the 
1970s fell into desuetude during negotiations due to their outmoded and controversial disability 
characterizations. These included both the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded 
Persons, G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/26/2856 (XXVI) (Dec. 20, 1971) and the 
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/30/3447 (Dec. 9, 1975). 
 66. For a discussion of violations of human rights and humanitarian law as factors causing 
disability, see DESPOUY, supra note 32, ¶¶ 119–26. International humanitarian law largely 
reflects medical/charity approaches to disability that rights-based and social/contextual models of 
disability have disparaged. See Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the 
Relational Value of the Rights to Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
249, 255 (2009) (noting that “[t]he shifting perspective of the social model, in contrast to the 
traditional medical model approach, reveals that the many factors exogenous to a disabled 
person’s own limitations are really what determine the extent to which that individual will be able 
to function in a given society”).  Still, it should be noted that international humanitarian law is a 
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IV.  THE ANTI-TORTURE FRAMEWORK WITHIN THE DISABILITY TREATY 
NEGOTIATIONS 
A.  The CRPD Drafting Context 
The Ad Hoc Committee responsible for negotiating the CRPD 
during the course of eight sessions and one working group meeting 
finalized its elaboration of the consensus CRPD text in August 2006, 
and in December 2006, it was adopted by the General Assembly.67 The 
text that emerged from that process as Article 15 of the CRPD is a 
relatively sparse provision.68 It adds little to existing human rights law 
on the prohibition against torture,69 at least if read apart from other 
CRPD provisions that most certainly expand its meaning and intended 
application.70 The consensus text also masks the considerable 
disagreement that surrounded the provision during the drafting process 
and that is extant at the level of State practice.71  
The drafting of the CRPD torture and abuse provisions took place 
against a well-developed normative landscape, which helped to shape 
actor identities and interests during the negotiation of Article 15 and 
related provisions.72 Various claims were put forward to support varying 
perspectives on how best to reflect the prohibition against torture and 
 
minimalist regime, seeking not to restructure or work systemic change in society; rather, it seeks 
to secure a protective veil around particularly vulnerable groups in armed conflict situations.   
 67. See United Nations General Assembly, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc No. A/61/611 (Dec. 6, 
2006), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/convtexte.htm [hereinafter United Nations 
General Assembly, 61st Sess.]. 
 68. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 69. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 23, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7. 
 70. See CRPD, supra note 1.  Article 15 must be read with reference to the articles of general 
application in the CRPD (Articles 1 through 9) and holistically, with reference to all other articles 
of the CRPD. For an overview of the structure and substantive obligations of the CRPD, see 
Process, Substance and Prospects, supra note 2, at 495–96, 500–04. 
 71. For a more detailed discussion of disagreements regarding past and future conventions, 
see Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disability:  The 
Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 181, 191–96 (2005). I have argued elsewhere that 
accounts of international law-making tend to overgeneralize and exaggerate processes of norm 
development, either because of the international lawyer’s drive to prove the existence and 
relevance of legal norms or the interest of the international relations scholar to prove the power of 
non-State actors in norm development, maintenance, and change. See Janet E. Lord, Normative 
Landscaping:  Power and Norms within Human Rights Law-Making Processes, Paper presented 
at Annual International Studies Association Conference, Honolulu, HI, March 2005 (on file with 
author). 
 72. See Process, Substance and Prospects, supra note 2; see also MARTHA FINNEMORE, 
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 3 (1996) (suggesting that the effects of norms 
are shared understandings according to which actor identities and interests are shaped). 
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other cruel, inhuman, or treatment or punishment within the disability 
context.73 In that regard, the CRPD process offered an interesting 
perspective on norm development, maintenance, and change in a 
specialized drafting context where the mandate was not to create “new” 
law, but rather to apply existing rights to persons with disabilities.74 
While ostensibly a theoretical exercise, such a perspective offers a 
deeper and richer understanding of human rights law in practice and can 
yield important insights for drafters and treaty implementers. 
In keeping with Brunnée’s (re)conceptualization of consensus in 
international law, human rights law-making (and law-making in other 
realms) is not fixed in time and fused at the point of formal adoption, 
but is a “continuous interactional [process].”75 Under this view, the 
CRPD negotiations formed a process whereby certain shared 
understandings converged regarding disability in relation to human 
rights law. In some instances, the negotiations triggered the progressive 
development of norms, while in other cases, negotiating conditions 
fostered constraint and even retraction. Here, Clifford Bob’s 
observation—that contentious and extensive political interactions 
occurring at every stage of the human rights law-making and 
implementation continuum are relevant to understanding norm 
diffusion—is particularly apt.76 Furthermore, this perspective on human 
rights law-making complements the continual development of law, 
rather than the static perspective yielded by traditional notions of 
consent that fail to explain human rights law-making. 
Understanding the normative “stickiness” of a particular provision 
is germane to treaty drafting actors, whether government delegates, 
NGO advocates, national human rights institutions, or others with 
 
 73. See infra notes 78–145 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Kayess & French, supra note 58, at 20 (noting that “[t]he GA mandate under which 
the CRPD was developed stipulated that the negotiating Committee was not to develop any new 
human rights, but was to apply existing human rights to the particular circumstances of persons 
with disability”). For Michael Byers’ fascinating (but underappreciated) work on norm 
maintenance, development, and change within the context of customary international law, see 
MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES:  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999) (applying an interdisciplinary perspective to 
study power and rules within the customary international law process; more specifically, the work 
examines an interactive and evolving customary law process that is shaped by State relations and 
poignantly structured by existing rules despite power differentials).  
 75. Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent:  Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2002). 
 76. See Clifford Bob, Fighting for New Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR 
NEW HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 30 (Clifford Bob ed., 2009). 
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interests in the process.77 Where a particular provision is a carefully 
negotiated text, its chances of progressive development in instances 
such as elaboration through interpretation are likely more limited. This 
also holds true with regard to the evolution of a well-settled norm that 
has developed over time. The discussion that follows tracks the drafting 
of Article 15 and related provisions and seeks to explain the shared 
understanding and outstanding disagreement masked by the consensus 
text. This discussion will also yield some insight into Article 15 
application and implementation. As drafted, many core human rights 
issues with the potential to trigger State responsibility under Article 15 
will require elaborate argumentation that draws on a holistic reading of 
the CRPD and engages provisions on non-discrimination and reasonable 
accommodation (Articles 2, 3, & 5), legal capacity (Article 12), 
physical and mental integrity (Article 17), informed consent (Articles 
15 & 25), and liberty of the person (Article 14). 
B.  Freedom from Torture and What Other Forms of Abuse? 
Some, though not all, of the early draft CRPD proposals and 
position papers reflected the inclusion of a provision prohibiting torture 
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment of persons 
with disabilities.78 The first proposal tabled at the Ad Hoc Committee, 
that of Mexico, included a provision on torture, cruel, inhumane, or 
 
 77. Malcolm Gladwell refers to the “stickiness factor” in his book, The Tipping Point, to 
discern the ingredient of a message that makes it memorable and gives it staying power. 
Normative stickiness, as used here, is similar because it understands the power of context and 
normative evolution’s sensitivity to the conditions and circumstances in which normative claims 
are made and deployed. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT:  HOW LITTLE THINGS 
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 19, 92 (2002). 
 78. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities:  Working Paper by Mexico, art. 9, July 29–Aug. 9, 2002, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.265/WP.1 [hereinafter Mexico Working Paper on Convention] (prescribing measures to 
prohibit sexual abuse and degrading treatment of persons with mental disabilities, and proposing 
strict regulation of psychiatric institutions); Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l 
Convention on the Prot. & Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  A Proposed Draft Text by China, arts. 5, 
12 (Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontrib-china.htm [hereinafter 
Proposed Draft by China] (ensuring the freedom and independence of persons with disabilities 
and designating hate crimes against persons with disabilities as “aggravated criminal behavior”); 
cf. Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Prot. & Promotion of the 
Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Draft Submitted by the Government of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, arts. 11–12, 17, June 16–27, 2003, U.N. Doc 
A/AC.265/2003/WP.1 [hereinafter Venezuela Draft] (proscribing various forms of violence and 
abuse and medical experimentation, though failing to reference the torture prohibition). 
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degrading treatment or punishment, as well as other violence.79 A legal 
analysis of the text, however, noted that while the proposal recognized 
that persons with disabilities are vulnerable to various forms of 
violence, the drafters did not couch the provision in terms of an explicit 
prohibition in line with existing international human rights law.80 
Rather, the provision required States to guarantee respect for dignity 
and integrity and, in that sense, represented weaker protection.81 The 
formulation received little attention, but it likely served as a placeholder 
for coverage of the torture prohibition in subsequent proposals, much as 
other provisions in the Mexican proposal helped shape the final text.82 
Following the second meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee in 2003, a 
regional consultation in Bangkok resulted in the adoption of a 
comprehensive draft convention, which was then submitted to the 2004 
Working Group.83 The draft ultimately served as the basis for several 
Working Group draft provisions.84 Draft Article 12(1)85 of the Bangkok 
 
 79. Article 9 of the Mexican proposal provided:  “States Parties recognize that persons with 
disabilities are particularly vulnerable to different forms of violence, as well as torture and other 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, in public and private spheres. Therefore, 
States shall guarantee respect for the dignity and integrity of persons with disabilities.” Mexico 
Working Paper on Convention, supra note 78, art. 9. A legal analysis of the text noted that while 
the proposal recognizes that people with disabilities are vulnerable to various forms of violence, 
the provision was not couched in terms of an explicit prohibition in line with existing 
international human rights law. Rather, it required States to guarantee respect for dignity and 
integrity and, in that sense, represented weaker protection. See Janet E. Lord & Katherine N. 
Guernsey, Legal Commentary on the Mexico Proposal, submitted to the Permanent Mission of 
Mexico to the United Nations (Winter 2002) (on file with author). 
 80. Id. at 9–10. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Perhaps the best example of the influence of the Mexican proposal was the inclusion of a 
provision with an amplified Conference of States Parties, an innovation for human rights treaties. 
See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 40; cf. Mexico Working Paper on Convention, supra note 78, art. 19 
(originally proposing the provision). 
 83. Regional Workshop Towards a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Oct. 14–17, 2003, Bangkok 
Draft:  Proposed Elements of a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to 
Promote and Protect the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ 
socdev/enable/rights/bangkokdraft.htm [hereinafter Bangkok Draft]. 
 84. See Report of the Working Group to the Ad Hoc Committee, Ad Hoc Comm. on a 
Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on the Prot. & Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities, Jan. 5–16, 2004, annex I, art. 11, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2004/WG.1 
(Jan. 27, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/documents/ahcwgreport.pdf 
[hereinafter Working Group Report]. 
 85. Bangkok Draft, supra note 83, art. 12, ¶ 1 (“No person with disability shall be subjected 
to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific experimentation [or 
intervention].”). 
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text articulated the legal prohibition against torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment of people with disabilities in terms 
consistent with the ICCPR formulation and inclusive of the ICCPR 
reference to prohibited “medical and scientific experimentation.”86 It 
also included a bracketed addition (“[or intervention]”) that would 
prohibit not only medical and scientific experimentation, but also 
undefined types of interventions.87 The brackets signaled significant 
disagreement among the Bangkok meeting participants about the 
expansion of prohibited conduct beyond experimentation.88 The 
language broadened the prohibited sphere of conduct and was intended 
to include involuntary medical interventions commonly provided to 
people with psycho-social disabilities, such as forced drugging.89  
The Bangkok draft included two paragraphs that represented a 
further effort to tailor the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment to 
the particular situation faced by people with disabilities.90 The first of 
these bracketed paragraphs suggest that medical or scientific 
“intervention” is lawful, provided that it is accompanied by a form of 
consent given by someone else, without specifying who, under what 
conditions, or otherwise providing the level of detail necessary to render 
the consent proviso meaningful.91 In other words, it addressed, to some 
extent, the situation of safeguards around substituted decision-making. 
Drafters were concerned with the issue of substituted decision-making 
throughout the negotiations92 and ultimately addressed it, not in the 
provision concerning torture, but in Article 12 of the final CRPD text.93 
The second bracketed paragraph added a prohibition against forced 
interventions aimed at altering a perceived or actual disability.94 Finally, 
the Bangkok draft included a third paragraph that addressed violence 
 
 86. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7. 
 87. Bangkok Draft, supra note 83, art. 12, ¶ 1. 
 88. See id. art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 89. See id. art. 12, ¶ 1. 
 90. See id. art. 12, ¶ 2. 
 91. See id. (“Where any person with disability is unable to give free and informed consent, 
no intervention shall occur unless a form of consent is given on their behalf by a duly authorized 
authority.”). 
 92. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Views submitted by 
Governments, Note by the Secretary-General, ¶ 66, UN Doc. A/AC.265/2003/4+A/AC.265/ 
2003/4/Corr.1 (June 16–27, 2003). 
 93. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 12, ¶ 4.  
 94. Bangkok Draft, supra note 83, art. 12, ¶ 2 (“Everyone has the right not to be subjected to 
forced or coerced interventions of a medical nature or otherwise, aimed at correcting, improving, 
or alleviating any actual or perceived impairment.”). 
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and abuse against persons with disabilities more generally, making 
specific mention of women and children and requiring States to “take all 
appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures” 
to provide protection against such acts.95 
The resulting Working Group text, adopted in 2004, and drawing 
in particular on the Bangkok formulation, was substantially broader 
than the final provision reflected in Article 15 of the CRPD.96 The final 
text engaged State responsibility for forced institutionalization and 
forced treatment, in addition to addressing torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and medical and 
scientific experimentation:97 
   1.  States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial, educational or other measures to prevent persons with 
disabilities from being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.  
   2.  In particular, States Parties shall prohibit, and protect persons 
with disabilities from, medical or scientific experimentation without 
the free and informed consent of the person concerned, and shall 
protect persons with disabilities from forced interventions or forced 
institutionalization aimed at correcting, improving, or alleviating any 
actual or perceived impairment.98 
The Coordinator noted during Working Group discussions that the 
traditional presumption, evident in State practice, in favor of 
involuntary interventions stands in contrast to the contemporary 
approach. Unlike the contemporary approach, the traditional approach 
expresses a presumption against intervention unless necessary.99 This 
contrast, the Coordinator concluded, signals that the contemporary 
approach could be a useful development.100  
 
 95. Id. art. 12, ¶ 3 (“States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social 
and educational measures to protect persons with disabilities, in particular, women and children 
with disabilities, from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or 
negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse.”). 
 96. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 97. See Contributions Submitted by Governments in Electronic Format at the Fourth 
Session, Proposed Modifications to Draft Article 11:  Freedom from Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 11, ¶¶ 1–2, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ 
ahc4da11.htm [hereinafter Fourth Session Modifications]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Working Group on the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, Working 
Group Daily Summary, Vol. 3, No. 3, 4 (January 7, 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20080511214655/http://www.worldenable.net/rights/wg1meetsummary03.htm (accessed through 
the Internet Archive) [hereinafter Working Group Daily Summary]. 
 100. Id. art. 11(1)–(2). 
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A number of delegations expressed support for the general 
approach taken in the draft text, albeit with caveats that revealed a 
considerable discomfiture.101 Japan noted, for example, that in principle, 
no forced intervention or institutionalization should occur.102 In 
exceptional cases, however, where forced intervention may be 
necessary—in cases of harm to self or others—there must be strict 
guidelines to prevent abuse and the convention should include judicial 
remedies for abuse.103 A footnote to the Working Group text presaged 
some of the most controversial aspects of future negotiating sessions 
and referenced a divergence in views on both (i) the appropriate 
placement of provisions concerning forced intervention and forced 
institutionalization, and (ii) whether such practices “should be permitted 
in accordance with appropriate legal procedures and safeguards.”104 
During the Third Session of the Ad Hoc Committee in 2004, much 
of the discussion on the draft torture provision in the Working Group 
draft centered on the appropriate placement of the language, at 
paragraph two, concerning forced intervention and forced 
institutionalization.105 While the International Disability Caucus (IDC), 
the coalition of disability organizations formed during the drafting 
process, asserted that forced interventions and institutionalization 
constitute cruel and inhuman treatment and therefore should be covered 
in the article on torture, support for this position represented only a 
small minority of the overall views.106 The most vocal NGO on this 
 
 101. See generally Working Group Daily Summary, supra note 99. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on the Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Rep. on its 3rd Sess., May 24–
June 4, 2004, 26 n.38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2004/5 (June 9, 2004), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev 
/enable/documents/ahc3reporte.pdf [hereinafter Report on Third Session] (“Members of the 
Working Group had differing opinions on whether forced intervention and forced 
institutionalization should be dealt with under ‘Freedom from torture’, or under ‘Freedom from 
violence and abuse’, or under both. Some members also considered that forced medical 
intervention and forced institutionalization should be permitted in accordance with appropriate 
legal procedures and safeguards.”). 
 105. See Working Group Report, supra note 84, at 17 n.38. 
 106. The position of the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, articulated at 
the Third Session, held constant throughout the negotiations, namely, that forced interventions 
constitute torture and that they must be proscribed in the torture provision as opposed to 
addressed in another article. See WNUSP Position, supra note 58. This position was endorsed at 
the Third Session by Kenya. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l 
Convention to Promote & Protect the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Daily Summary of 
Third Meeting, Vol. 4, No. 3 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/ 
rights/ahc3sum26may.htm [hereinafter Summary of Third Meeting]. 
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issue was the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry 
(WNUSP) whose position was that the new treaty “should prohibit 
unwanted medical and related interventions as a form of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . [and] prohibit any 
kind of confinement or internment based in whole or in part on 
disability.”107 WNUSP therefore held that the specific language was 
important to include in the draft torture provision and should not be 
shifted elsewhere, or worse, be excluded altogether creating the need to 
assert a prohibition by implication.108  
Other attempts during the Third Session to broaden language 
formulations, as in Algeria’s proposal to proscribe torture “in all its 
forms,”109 Thailand’s proposal in relation to the prohibition of medical 
or scientific “and other forms of” experimentation,110 and Uganda’s 
proposal to reference “abduction,”111 alongside the language requiring 
protection from forced interventions, received only limited support. As 
detailed below, delegations preferred to maintain formulations that 
mirrored language found in the ICCPR.112 Also, at the Third Session, 
India proposed to merge Article 11 and 12 (violence and abuse), which 
received some support, but was not ultimately accepted.113 In addition, 
Mexico introduced a proposal to add a third paragraph to the draft 
article which would address monitoring the living situations of persons 
with disabilities.114 This proposal appeared in the draft text of the Report 
of the Third Session, but it did not make its way into the final text 
 
 107. WNUSP Position, supra note 58. For more discussion on the drafting of the CRPD 
provisions concerning persons with mental disabilities, see Dhir, supra note 71. 
 108. See WNUSP Position, supra note 58. 
 109. Report on Third Session, supra note 104, art. 11, ¶ 1; see Summary of Third Meeting, 
supra note 106.  
 110. Report on Third Session, supra note 104, art. 11, ¶ 2; see Summary of Third Meeting, 
supra note 106.  
 111. Report on Third Session, supra note 104, art. 11, ¶ 2. 
 112. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7. 
 113. Report on Third Session, supra note 104, art. 11, ¶ 1. At the Fifth Session, the 
Coordinator referred Article 11 to a Facilitator, Ms. Carina Mårtensson. Ad Hoc Comm. on a 
Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on the Prot. & Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities, Rep. on its 5th Sess., Jan. 24, 2007–Feb. 4, 2007, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.265/2005/2 (Feb. 23, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ 
ahc5docs/ahc5reporte.pdf [hereinafter Report on Fifth Session]. 
 114. See Report on Third Session, supra note 104, art. 11, ¶ 3; Summary of Third Meeting, 
supra note 106. The amendment on monitoring proposed by Mexico provided:  “In order to 
monitor living conditions and facilities of places where persons with disabilities are placed, 
international instruments shall be applied, as appropriate, including the Optional Protocol of the 
Convention against Torture, for the realization of visits by national or international bodies to 
detention centres.” Report on Third Session, supra note 104, art. 11, ¶ 3. 
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(although the final text of Article 16 does contain a monitoring 
provision).115 This reflected the drafters’ sense that close monitoring of 
the living conditions of persons with disabilities in prisons and other 
institutional settings is essential.116 
The draft provision (Article 11) was taken up briefly again at the 
Fourth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee.117 Discussions quickly turned 
to structural and, by implication, substantive concerns over the inclusion 
of the second sentence of Article 11(2), with the EU proposing deletion 
of the language “and shall protect persons with disabilities from forced 
interventions or forced institutionalisation aimed at correcting, 
improving, or alleviating any actual or perceived impairment.”118 This 
proposal was supported by a number of delegations primarily on the 
basis that such practices do not give rise to an absolute prohibition 
against which no derogation is permitted, unlike the proscription of 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or 
punishment.119 Accordingly, there was a strong move at the Fourth 
Session to extract the reference to forced institutionalization and forced 
treatment for placement elsewhere in the draft convention, separate and 
apart from the torture provision.120  
At the Fifth Session in 2005, New Zealand proffered new language 
that sought to address the substantive issues of medical and scientific 
experimentation, forced institutionalization, and involuntary treatment 
by amending draft Articles 11 and 12 and creating a new Article 12 
(bis).121 Its core rationale for doing so was based on its view that forced 
interventions and forced institutionalization are best addressed in the 
 
 115. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 16, ¶ 3 (“In order to prevent the occurrence of all forms of 
exploitation, violence and abuse, States Parties shall ensure that all facilities and programmes 
designed to serve persons with disabilities are effectively monitored by independent 
authorities.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Proposed Draft by China, supra note 78, art. 7; Venezuela Draft, supra 
note 78, arts. 11–12, 17. 
 117. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on the Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Rep. on its 4th Sess., ¶ 9, U.N. 
Doc. A/59/360, (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ 
ahc4reporte.htm. 
 118. See Fourth Session Modifications, supra note 97, art. 11, ¶ 2. 
 119. See Summary of Third Meeting, supra note 106. 
 120. See Ad Hoc Comm. on the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, Daily 
Summary of Discussions Related to Article 11, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Aug. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc4sumart11.htm. 
 121. See New Zealand:  Proposed Modifications to Draft Articles 11 and 12, Contributions to 
the Fifth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on 
Prot. & Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, http://www.un.org/esa/ 
socdev/enable/rights/ahc5newzealand.htm [hereinafter New Zealand Proposed Modifications]. 
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context of a new article on “Free and Informed Consent to 
Interventions,” separate from Article 11, because “there are absolutely 
no circumstances where violence, abuse and torture or cruel, inhumane 
or degrading treatment is acceptable.”122 
While the New Zealand proposal was not taken up, the Fifth 
Session considerably advanced the form and structure of the draft article 
on torture.123 The draft provision was reordered with a new first 
paragraph added to closely mirror the language in the ICCPR. It 
reflected the view of States that the language must contain an absolute 
prohibition against torture and other forms of abuse, in line with other 
instruments.124 The original first paragraph as drafted by the Working 
Group was renumbered and structured as paragraph 2.125  
Outstanding difficulties related to the draft provision on torture 
were referred to the facilitator at the Fifth Session for informal 
consultations among States in an effort to reach consensus on those 
 
 122. Id. The new language proposed for a draft Article 12 (bis) provided:   
1. States Parties shall take the necessary measures to ensure that medical or scientific, 
experimentation or interventions, including corrective surgery, aimed at correcting, 
improving or alleviating any actual or perceived impairment, are undertaken with the 
free and informed consent of the person concerned[.] 
2. Such measures shall include the provision of appropriate and accessible information 
to persons with disabilities and their families[.] 
3. States Parties shall accept the principle that forced institutionalisation of persons 
with disabilities on the basis of disability is illegal.  
4. In countries where involuntary treatment has not been abolished it shall only be used 
only in exceptional circumstances prescribed by law and its use shall be minimised 
through the active promotion of alternatives[.] 
5. States Parties shall ensure in any case of involuntary treatment of persons with 
disabilities that: 
a. it is undertaken in accordance with the procedures established by law and with 
the application of appropriate legal safeguards[;] 
b. the law shall provide that the interventions are in the least restrictive settings 
possible and the best interests of the person concerned will be fully taken into 
account[; and] 
c. forced interventions are appropriate for the person and provided without 
financial cost to the individual receiving the treatment or to his or her family. 
Australia reflected the view of many States during the course of the negotiations on Article 11 in 
stating that “a simple blanket ban on involuntary interventions or care of any kind, without the 
consideration that this may be necessary in some occasions with appropriate legal procedures and 
safeguards, is not acceptable.” Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention 
on Prot. & Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Daily Summary of 
Discussion at the Fifth Session, Vol. 6, No. 5 (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ 
enable/rights/ahc5sum28jan.htm. 
 123. See Report on Fifth Session, supra note 113, ¶¶ 36–42. 
 124. See id. ¶ 36.  
 125. See id. ¶ 37. 
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matters.126 One proposal suggested an amendment to the language “free 
and informed consent” to more explicitly emphasize the nature of 
consent (“free, informed and clearly expressed prior consent”).127 
Notably, some delegations opposed any change on the basis that the 
phrase was well-understood in international human rights law,128 which 
was reflected in a General Comment of the Human Rights Committee,129 
and also on the basis that the notion of prior, clear expression of consent 
was implicit.130 Second, the Fifth Session proposed that the words “or 
other form of” be added to the phrase “medical or scientific 
experimentation,” which would then read “medical, scientific or other 
forms of experimentation,” and thus broaden the parameters of the 
prohibition.131 Finally, delegations were in agreement on the wording 
“[s]tates parties shall prohibit, and protect persons with disabilities 
from, medical or scientific experimentation without the free and 
informed consent of the person concerned,” but were unable to reach 
consensus on the wording or placement of the second part of the 
provision referencing the principle of protecting persons with 
disabilities from “forced interventions or forced institutionalization 
aimed at correcting, improving or alleviating any actual or perceived 
impairment.”132 Similarly, the Fifth Session designated the wording and 
meaning of the terms “institutionalization” and “perceived” in the draft 
text for further consideration, along with the overall placement of the 
provision.133 There seemed to be consensus in line with the 
recommendation of the Chair that paragraph 2 follow the formula used 
in the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), Article 2(1), 
which refers to “legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures” 
 
 126. See id. ¶¶ 38–42. 
 127. Id. ¶ 39. Thus, in the position paper of New Zealand submitted at the Fifth Session, it 
was emphasized that care should be taken “to separate the right to free and informed consent from 
issues related to torture and abuse.” Furthermore, “[u]nlike torture or violence there are 
exceptions to the right to free and informed consent.” Also, “[i]f this convention is to outline 
these exceptions, which essentially allow for some forms of involuntary treatment, then they must 
be given strong qualifiers and detailed attention.” New Zealand Proposed Modifications, supra 
note 121. 
 128. See Report on Fifth Session, supra note 113, ¶ 39. 
 129. See Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, General Comment No. 20:  Article 7 
(Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) (Mar. 
10, 1992), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883fb0.html [hereinafter CCPR General 
Comment No. 20]. 
 130. See Report on Fifth Session, supra note 113, ¶ 39. 
 131. See id. ¶ 40. 
 132. See id. ¶ 41. 
 133. See id. 
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and which had been supported by a number of delegations on the basis 
that further amplification was unnecessary and might create interpretive 
difficulties in relation to the CAT.134 
At the Seventh Session, the Ad Hoc Committee resumed its 
consideration of the draft provision on torture and other forms of ill-
treatment, which had been renumbered Article 15 during the course of 
amendments and overall restructuring of the draft convention text.135 
The IDC maintained its position that language concerning the protection 
of the right to mental and physical integrity be moved to the torture 
prohibition article and be further amended to reflect language in the 
American Convention.136 The Chair’s summary of discussions indicated 
that (i) the draft text had a good level of support; (ii) the proposal to 
restructure Article 15(1) by moving the second sentence to Article 17137 
was supported by some, opposed by others, and would be revisited; and 
(iii) the Mexican proposal to replace the term “experimentation” with 
“procedures” had some support, but it was withdrawn in view of the 
debate.138 
C.  Medical Experimentation Prohibition and the Travaux 
Préparatoires 
The original Working Group text contained the prohibition against 
medical and scientific experimentation in a second discrete paragraph, 
following the first paragraph concerning torture.139 The provision made 
specific reference to the prohibition in the absence of free and informed 
 
 134. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Letter dated 7 October 2005 from 
the Chairman to all members of the Committee, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/1 (Oct. 14, 
2005), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcchairletter7oct.htm. 
 135. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on the Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Report of the Coordinator to the 
Fifth Session, Draft Article 11, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata15fisreport 
.htm. 
 136. See Int’l Disability Caucus, Chairman’s Text as Amended by the International Disability 
Caucus art. 17 (Working Paper), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ 
ahc7docs/ahc7idcchairamend1.doc (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) [hereinafter IDC Chairman’s 
Text]. 
 137. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Daily Summary of Discussion at 
the Seventh Session, Vol. 8, No. 4, art. 15 (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/ 
rights/ahc7sum19jan.htm. 
 138. See IDC Chairman’s Text, supra note 136, art. 17. 
 139. See Working Group Report, supra note 84, art. 11, ¶ 2. 
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consent language included in Article 7 of the ICCPR,140 but not 
appearing in the UDHR, ECHR, or ACHR. As noted by Nowak, the 
drafting history of the ICCPR reveals the tension faced by drafters in 
finding a formulation that expressly prohibits criminal experimentation, 
whilst preserving legitimate scientific and medical experiments or 
practices, such as emergency medical procedures to preserve the life of 
an unconscious person, required vaccination programs, or water 
fluoridation programs.141 
Early discussions in the drafting of the CRPD concerning the 
prohibition of scientific and medical experimentation centered on its 
controversial pairing with language concerning protection from forced 
interventions and forced institutionalization in the Working Group 
text.142 The draft paragraph, therefore, carried both an obligation 
reflected in the ICCPR (prohibition against medical experimentation 
absent informed consent) as well as the additional obligation to “protect 
persons with disabilities from forced interventions or forced 
institutionalization aimed at correcting, improving, or alleviating any 
actual or perceived impairment.”143 This formulation was controversial, 
however, because there was no precedent found in existing human 
rights conventions to support the additional obligation.144 A footnote to 
the Working Group text referenced the controversy surrounding this 
additional reference, both in terms of its structural placement as well as 
its substantive impact.145 During the Working Group, some States 
expressed concern over the inclusion of the issue of forced 
 
 140. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7. 
 141. See NOWAK, supra note 25, at 138; see also Zaim M. Nedjati, Human Rights Under the 
European Convention, in 8 EUROPEAN STUDIES IN LAW 61, 63 (A.G. Chloros ed., 1978) 
(“Having regard to the travaux préparatoires of the UN Covenant text . . . it would appear that 
there was no intention in Article 7 of the Covenant to exclude genuine medical experiments or to 
prohibit practices which might be permitted in European Member States, such as experiments 
with the fluoridation of water.”). 
 142. See Fourth Session Modifications, supra note 97, draft art. 11, ¶ 2. 
 143. Working Group Report, supra note 84, draft art. 11, ¶ 2. 
 144. See generally Fourth Session Modifications, supra note 97, draft art. 11 (European 
Union proposing to delete the phrase “and shall protect persons with disabilities from forced 
interventions or forced institutionalisation aimed at correcting, improving, or alleviating any 
actual or perceived impairment”). 
 145. Footnote 38 to the Working Group draft Article 11 reads: 
Members of the Working Group had differing opinions on whether forced intervention 
and forced institutionalization should be dealt with under ‘Freedom from torture’, or 
under ‘Freedom from violence and abuse’, or under both. Some members also 
considered that forced medical intervention and forced institutionalization should be 
permitted in accordance with appropriate legal procedures and safeguards. 
Working Group Report, supra note 84, draft art. 11, n.38.  
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institutionalization and forced treatment in the provision on torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, on the basis that 
its placement alongside the torture provision would be inappropriate.146 
Other States expressed the view that forced institutionalization and 
forced treatment should be permissible in certain cases subject to 
procedural safeguards.147 This argument was based on the commonplace 
practice in domestic laws to allow for such interventions in narrow 
circumstances, and provided the rationale for placing the issue in 
another part of the text given that the prohibition against torture is a 
non-derogable right, admitting of no exception. 
D.  The Final Article 15 Text 
The final formulation of the prohibition of torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Convention148 
parallels the provision found in Article 7 of ICCPR,149 and therefore, 
does not contextualize the torture prohibition with respect to persons 
with disabilities: 
Article 15 
Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment 
   1. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation. 
   2. States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on an 
equal basis with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.150 
 Note that the phrasing of the first paragraph of Article 15, in line 
with the ICCPR and not CAT, is significant because the ICCPR applies 
to private institutions151 whereas CAT is restricted to public settings.152 
 
 146. See id. 
 147. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Prot. & 
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Seventh Session, Comments, 
Proposals and Amendments Submitted Electronically, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/ 
rights/ahcstata15sevscomments.htm#argentina [hereinafter Seventh Session Electronic 
Submissions] 
 148. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 149. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7. 
 150. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 151. See ICCPR, supra note 23, pmbl & art. 1 (applying the ICCPR to all individuals without 
restriction). 
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Additionally, the text does not refer to any of the specific practices 
proposed by some during the course of the negotiations for explicit 
reference in Article 15.153 The CRPD Committee must therefore give 
meaning to the prohibition in the myriad of contexts referenced by the 
drafters during the treaty drafting process.  
The prohibition set out in Article 15 of the CRPD is reinforced by 
an exceedingly spare Article 17 that simply and decidedly without 
illumination guarantees the physical and mental integrity of persons 
with disabilities.154 Article 17, then, is the ultimate product of the 
controversy that arose during the initial negotiations around Article 
15.155 The provision came about when fraught negotiations around 
forced institutionalization and forced treatment moved to a debate over 
the proposed new provision. As noted by Kayess and French: 
The IDC and WNUSP sought the ultimate goal of the CRPD 
‘outlawing’ all forms of compulsory assistance, but, when this 
proved impossible to achieve, they adopted the alternative lobbying 
stance that there ought to be no reference to compulsory treatment in 
the CRPD as this would provide it with legitimacy.156  
Accordingly, Article 17 provides no guidance whatsoever on the 
regulation of forced treatment that is practiced often with sweeping 
abandon and with little or no due process protection in many parts of the 
world.157 
Still, Articles 15 and 17 of the CRPD must be understood by 
reference to the CRPD general principles in Article 3,158 along with 
other substantive articles relating to legal capacity, informed consent, 
and similar topics. This understanding entails a more nuanced process 
of interpretation that not all actors will be up to undertaking. Even the 
mainstream human rights organizations have a history of ignoring the 
 
 152. See Committee Against Torture, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). Alignment with 
the ICCPR occurred during the Seventh Session of negotiations, upon a proposal by the Latin 
American and Caribbean Group. See Seventh Session Electronic Submissions, supra note 147; 
see also MARIANNE SCHULZE, UNDERSTANDING THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 99 (Handicap International ed., 2009), available at http://www. 
handicap-international.fr/fileadmin/documents/publications/HICRPDManual.pdf (asserting that 
the language of Article 15 can be found in ICCPR Article 7). 
 153. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 154. See id. art. 17.  
 155. See Kayess & French, supra note 58, at 29–30. 
 156. Id. at 30. 
 157. See especially MDRI HUNGARY REPORT, supra note 7. 
 158. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 3. 
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human rights of persons with disabilities and have neglected to apply 
international standards to persons with disabilities.159 In some instances, 
mainstream human rights organizations chose to highlight abuses 
against political prisoners held in the very same institutions as persons 
with disabilities, without recognizing how such treatment infringes upon 
political prisoner and disabled detainee alike.160 At the same time, the 
CRPD offers opportunities for creative and mutually beneficial 
partnerships between mainstream human rights organizations and 
disability rights organizations around Article 15 and related advocacy.161 
Articles with a particularly close relationship to Article 15 include 
Article 16, which prohibits violence, abuse, and exploitation of persons 
with disabilities162 and, Article 17,163 which provides additional avenues 
through which meaning may be given to the CRPD’s anti-torture 
framework. These articles also give rise to varying interpretations. The 
IDC claimed that Articles 15 and 17, in combination with the 
requirement of informed consent in Article 25 and Article 12 on legal 
capacity, provide protection against any form of forced or compulsory 
intervention.164 More recently, others have pointed to Article 14 in 
asserting that it serves the function of prohibiting forced or compulsory 
treatment or living situations such as institutionalization.165 States have 
already entered reservations to clarify their position on these matters; 
however, they suggest that the interpretation put forward by the IDC is 
far from crystallized at the level of State practice.166 
 
 159. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Uzbekistan:  Dissident Forced Into 
Psychiatric Detention (Sep. 2, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/09/03/ 
uzbeki11684.htm. For an illustration of where mainstream human rights organizations highlight 
abuses against political dissidents held in unacceptable conditions in psychiatric institutions, but 
pay no attention to the human rights situation of others held under the same conditions, see Press 
Release, Human Rights Watch, Uzbekistan:  Psychiatric Punishment Used to Quash Dissent:  
Government Deploys Stalinist-Era Tactic Against Leading Human Rights Defender (Oct. 19, 
2005), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/20/uzbeki11905.htm. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 162. See id. art. 16. 
 163. Id. art. 17. 
 164. IDC Chairman’s Text, supra note 136, arts. 15, 25. 
 165. For example, the International Disability Alliance notes that Article 14 prohibits 
deprivation of liberty based on the existence of a disability. See Int’l Disability Alliance et al., 
OPCAT Monitoring of Psychiatric Institutions and Related Issues in Other Forms of Detention:  
CRPD Framework (Oct. 2009), http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2009/10/IDAOPCATRecommendationsFinal.doc [hereinafter OPCAT Monitoring]. 
 166. Australia, for example, entered a declaration to Article 17 stating:  “Australia recognizes 
that every person with disability has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity 
on an equal basis with others. Australia further declares its understanding that the Convention 
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The relationship between Article 15 and Article 5 (equality and 
non-discrimination) should also be underscored. As an article of general 
application to be applied across the CRPD text, Article 5 requires States 
to ensure the equality of persons with disabilities in their societies while 
also prohibiting all types of discrimination “on the basis of disability.”167 
To that end, the CRPD requires States to recognize “that all persons are 
equal before and under the law” and therefore are entitled “to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law” free of any discrimination.168 
States must “prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability”169 and 
“take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is 
provided.”170 The section that follows analyzes State obligations in 
respect of the torture prohibition under Article 15, focusing on the 
disability-specific context of the provision and issues requiring 
guidance in particular from the CRPD Committee. 
V.  STATE DUTIES TO RESPECT, PROTECT, AND FULFILL THE RIGHT TO BE 
FREE FROM TORTURE OR CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT 
OR PUNISHMENT 
In interpreting Article 15 of the CRPD, it is critical to give 
substantive content to the concepts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment within the specific context of 
disability.171 The nature and existence of these legal concepts, insofar as 
they pertain particularly to the lived experience of people with 
disabilities, have been addressed to some extent in human rights 
 
allows for compulsory assistance or treatment of persons, including measures taken for the 
treatment of mental disability, where such treatment is necessary, as a last resort and subject to 
safeguards.” Declarations and Reservations, U.N. ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default 
.asp?id=475 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).  
 167. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 5. For a discussion of the three main normative theories of 
equality (and by implication, non-discrimination) that are applied to the disability context, see 
Gerard Quinn, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Disability:  A 
Conceptual Framework, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS:  ESSAYS AND RELEVANT 
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 69, 72–75 (Theresia Degener & Yolan Koster-Dreese eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter A Conceptual Framework]. 
 168. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 5, ¶ 1.  
 169. Id. art. 5, ¶ 2. 
 170. Id. art. 5, ¶ 3. 
 171. Indeed, the stated purpose of the CRPD is:  “While the Convention does not recognize 
any new human right of persons with disabilities, it clarifies the application of existing rights to 
the specific situation of persons with disabilities.” Annual Report of the United Nations High 
Comm’r for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Comm’r and the Sec’y-Gen., 
U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, 10th Sess., Mar. 2–27, 2009, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/10/48 (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter OHCHR Report]. 
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practice and have given rise to the same difficulties of interpretation that 
confront interpreters of such provisions generally.172 These issues 
include, inter alia:  (i) differentiating between acts that constitute torture 
on the one hand and acts that, for the lack of one or more fundamental 
elements of the torture definition, would fall into the categories of cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (ii) identification of 
when the failure of a State to ensure protection against conduct by 
private actors triggers responsibility under Article 15; and (iii) when 
responsibility is triggered for failing to respect the prohibition against 
punishment (as opposed to treatment) that amounts to torture or may be 
considered cruel, inhuman, or degrading. 
The delineation of individual offenses within Article 15 of the 
CRPD is ultimately a subjective exercise that will depend upon the 
circumstances of the case and conduct in question. The Human Rights 
Committee has asserted that it does not “consider it necessary to 
develop a list of prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions 
between different kinds of punishment or treatment; the distinction 
depends on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment applied.”173 
The jurisprudence of the ECHR has examined, in a number of cases, the 
ambit of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
according to which torture entails deliberateness of action, causing very 
serious and cruel suffering and inhuman treatment or punishment 
involving intense mental or physical suffering.174 Its jurisprudence 
supports taking into account the individual circumstances of the victim, 
including his or her disability and attendant accommodation needs.175 
The discussion below considers specific instances where Article 15 is 
most likely to be triggered. 
 
 172. See SCHULZE, supra note 152, at 69–70. 
 173. CCPR General Comment No. 20, supra note 129, ¶ 4. Common elements pertaining to 
all acts within the torture and ill-treatment prohibition include:  (i) meeting a minimum threshold 
level of severity; (ii) subjective and objective assessment; (iii) physical and or mental suffering 
fall within the scope of protection; (iv) the protection is not confined to the criminal investigation 
and judicial process. See Byrnes, supra note 23, at 217–20.  
 174. For a useful analysis of this jurisprudence, see Colm O’Cinneide, Extracting Protection 
for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities from Human Rights Framework—Established Limits 
and New Possibilities, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:  
EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 224–29 (Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir & Gerard 
Quinn eds., 2009). 
 175. For a useful summary of these cases, see MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CTR., 
SUMMARIES OF MENTAL DISABILITY CASES DECIDED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 13–72 (2007), available at http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Summaries%20 
of%20Mental%20Disability%20Cases%20Decided%20by%20the%20European%20Court%20of
%20Human%20Rights.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARIES OF ECHR CASES]. 
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A.  Disability Accommodations and Conditions of Detention and 
Imprisonment 
Particularly relevant, not only for detainees and prisoners with 
disabilities, but also for persons with disabilities in other institutional 
settings, is the scrutiny of living conditions against human rights 
standards, including the torture prohibition. In Price v. United Kingdom, 
the Court found that the prison conditions of a woman with a disability 
who used a wheelchair were inappropriate given her accommodation 
needs.176 The Court held that “to detain a severely disabled person in 
conditions where she is dangerously cold, risks developing sores 
because her bed is too hard or unreachable, and is unable to go the toilet 
or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty, constituted degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3.”177 The approach of the ECHR in this 
regard—namely, recognizing the particular accommodation needs of an 
individual—is very much in keeping with the CRPD. The CRPD’s 
explicit recognition that the failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation to a person with a disability constitutes discrimination 
is therefore a core component of an overall analysis of conditions of 
treatment and punishment under Article 15. Earlier cases decided by the 
European Commission suggesting a much higher threshold for finding a 
violation of permissible detention conditions must be regarded with 
considerable skepticism.178 
While there is a tendency to focus narrowly on protecting persons 
held in detention and imprisonment from torture and other ill-treatment, 
some rightly suggest that there are clearly other contexts within which 
 
 176. Price v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 53 (2002). 
 177. Id.; see also Farbtuhs v. Latvia, App. No. 4672/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (holding that the 
continued imprisonment of a disabled elderly prisoner with intensive support needs and several 
serious health conditions was inappropriate, because his continued detention would cause him 
permanent anxiety and a sense of inferiority and humiliation so acute as to constitute degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3).  
 178. See B. v. United Kingdom, App. No 6870/75, 1983 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 6, ¶¶ 4–5 
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (finding that detaining a prisoner diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia 
in Broadmoor Hospital does not violate Article 3, notwithstanding proven conditions of 
overcrowding, poor sanitation and hygiene, lack of appropriate employment and occupation, and 
lack of psychiatric treatment. The Commission’s assessment failed to consider the applicant’s 
mental disability or how the conditions could, in the aggregate, amount to inhuman treatment or 
punishment.); Chartier v. Italy, App. No. 9044/80, 33 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41, ¶¶ 4, 
17 (1983) (rejecting an application because the applicant, a prisoner with hereditary obesity, 
respiratory problems, hypertension, and pancreatic diabetes held in a detention center for persons 
with physical disabilities and who required medical treatment unavailable where he was detained, 
received necessary treatment and because prison was likely a “particularly painful experience” 
given his serious health problems).  
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the protection is relevant.179 Article 15 of the CRPD is most certainly 
applicable when assessing the treatment of students with disabilities in 
both State-run and privately-run schools, as well as rehabilitation 
clinics, social care institutions, and the like. The work of DRI180 and the 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC)181 in Budapest have 
considerably advanced human rights analyses in the context of the 
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment 
prohibition as applied to persons with disabilities. The obligation under 
the CRPD to accommodate persons with disabilities—with the failure to 
do so constituting discrimination—will no doubt animate the work of 
DRI, MDAC, and others, including national human rights institutions 
and hopefully, the work of national torture preventive mechanisms 
established under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture. 
B.  Practices Involving the Use of Restraints and Seclusion 
In addition to the poor conditions for detention in prisons and in 
other institutional settings that may amount to torture or other ill-
treatment, practices that involve the use of restraints or seclusion 
similarly require serious scrutiny under Article 15. Thus, for example, 
the use of cage beds182 and other types of restraints183 clearly falls within 
the ambit of Article 15 and has been so highlighted by the Special 
Rapporteur.184 The use of medication, particularly psychotropic 
medications, either on prisoners or persons with disabilities in 
institutions where overmedication is used as a form of chemical 
restraint for treatment (or punishment) will also fall afoul of the 
proscription.185 Remote administration of electroshock delivered via 
backpacks as a form of behavioral modification or aversive therapy, as 
 
 179. See Byrnes, supra note 23, at 211 n.64. 
 180. For human rights reporting and documentation by Disability Rights International, see 
MDRI reports, supra note 7. 
 181. For human rights reporting and documentation by Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 
see SUMMARIES OF ECHR CASES, supra note 175. 
 182. See MDAC CAGE BEDS REPORT, supra note 12, at 23–58. 
 183. See European Comm. for the Prevention of Torture & Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, The CPT Standards:  “Substantive” Sections of the CPT’s General Reports, 
¶¶ 47–50, CPT/Inf/E (2009), available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.pdf. 
The Special Rapporteur has stressed that any prolonged use of restraints unquestionably violates 
the prohibition against torture or ill-treatment. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 55. 
 184. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶¶ 55–56. 
 185. See id. ¶ 63. 
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recently documented in a United States institution,186 is clearly contrary 
to Article 15, among other provisions of the CRPD. Domestic 
legislation clarifying the prohibition of such practices is an area where 
there is much work to be done among States.  
The Human Rights Committee has indicated that “prolonged 
solitary confinement of the detained or imprisoned person” may 
constitute torture or other ill-treatment.187 The use of solitary 
confinement in the case of a person with a mental disability amounted 
to inhuman and degrading treatment in one case before the Inter-
American Commission.188 The CRPD requires close scrutiny of any 
solitary confinement situation and the particular situation of persons 
with disabilities, and makes clear that confinement based on disability 
constitutes discrimination. When assessing the legality of solitary 
confinement or seclusion in a given case, the individual’s circumstances 
and particular accommodation needs must be taken into account.189 
Seclusion and isolation that take place outside the framework of prison 
or institutions must likewise be closely examined, as so often persons 
with disabilities are isolated in their communities, chained to beds, 
locked away in their homes, and otherwise isolated.190 Such customary 
practices tend not to be highlighted or documented by human rights 
organizations, but State responsibility may indeed be triggered in such 
cases where States fail to exercise due diligence in bringing an end to 
such practices, providing sanctions against perpetrators and remedies to 
victims.191 
 
 186. See MDRI ROTENBERG CENTER REPORT, supra note 22. 
 187. CCPR General Comment No. 20, supra note 129, ¶ 6. 
 188. See Congo v. Ecuador, supra note 30, ¶ 59. The Inter-American Commission approved 
precautionary measures to protect persons detained in a psychiatric hospital in Paraguay, 
including two teenage boys held in solitary confinement in miserable conditions for more than 
four years, in a case facilitated by DRI. See INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., supra note 30, ¶ 60. 
 189. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶¶ 77, 82. Note, too, that under the CAT 
definition of torture, the purpose element is fulfilled if disability discrimination is found. See 
CAT, supra note 24, art. 1. 
 190. See, e.g., MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, TORMENT NOT TREATMENT:  SERBIA’S 
SEGREGATION AND ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2007), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/MDRI_Serbia41.pdf. 
 191. See General Comment No. 2, supra note 26, ¶ 18; see also Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Rep. on the Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008) (by Manfred 
Nowak), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/101/61/PDF/ 
G0810161.pdf [hereinafter Nowak Report]. 
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C.  Practices Involving Compulsory or Forced Treatment 
Another set of cases relevant for the interpretation of Article 15 
concerns instances of compulsory or forced treatment, particularly those 
involving persons with psycho-social disabilities. Early drafts of the 
CRPD contained specific language on such practices, along with 
involuntary institutionalization,192 but the Ad Hoc Committee ultimately 
excised it from the torture provision193 and the CRPD final text, leaving 
advocates without specific proscriptive language.194 
The ECHR has established a particularly high—and highly 
dubious in the light of the CRPD—threshold for the characterization of 
forced treatment as proscribed conduct under Article 3 of the European 
Convention,195 principally through the application of the doctrine of 
“medical necessity.” Thus, in Herczegfalvy v. Austria,196 the court 
considered the application of a prisoner diagnosed with a mental 
disability who claimed that the prison guards had given him sedatives 
unnecessarily and involuntarily, force-fed him, and restrained him with 
handcuffs to a hospital bed for weeks in violation of Article 3.197 The 
court held that there was no violation on the basis of the doctrine of 
therapeutic necessity, according to which medical authorities “decide, 
on the basis of the recognised rules of medical science, on the 
therapeutic methods to be used” in a particular case, “if necessary by 
force, to preserve the physical and mental health of patients.”198 The 
view embraced by the court was that a measure deemed—apparently by 
doctors in a unilateral process of decision-making—to be a therapeutic 
necessity cannot be classified as inhuman or degrading.199 The sweeping 
thrust of this decision, which acts as a presumption in favor of 
institutional and substituted decision-making, must be regarded as 
deeply flawed when set against the aim of the CRPD, which is to 
preserve the autonomy and participation of persons with disabilities in 
all contexts, including medical decision-making.200 
 
 192. See, e.g., Report on Fifth Session, supra note 113, ¶ 41.  
 193. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 194. See id. annex I–II.  
 195. See CPHRFF, supra note 28, art. 3.  
 196. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 242-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992), 15 E.H.R.R. 437, 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=695658& 
portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA3986
49. 
 197. Id. ¶¶ 25–28. 
 198. Id. ¶ 82. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See CRPD, supra note 1, arts. 3, 4.3, 25. 
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A holistic reading of the CRPD calls for a more robust 
interpretation of the prohibition than that espoused by the ECHR in 
Herczegfalvy v. Austria. Such an approach is suggested in treaty body 
practice, under which the forced and non-consensual administration of 
psychiatric drugs has been recognized as a form of torture or inhuman 
treatment.201 Moreover, Article 15 of the Convention, read together with 
Article 17 (respect for mental and physical integrity),202 Article 19 (right 
to independent living in the community),203 and Article 12 (legal 
capacity),204 in particular, require the application of a highly robust 
informed consent regime. 
The Special Rapporteur on Torture has also recognized that 
involuntary commitment and deprivation of liberty based on the 
existence of a disability might, under certain circumstances, constitute 
torture or other ill-treatment.205 Following the argumentation put 
forward by the Special Rapporteur, the NGO coalition, IDA, proffered 
that the administration of psychiatric treatments such as neuroleptic 
drugs and electroshock absent free and informed consent “may 
constitute torture or ill-treatment”206 and further, that “involuntary 
commitment to psychiatric institutions for any reason may also 
constitute torture or ill-treatment.”207 Whether such practices will be 
eliminated over time through the application of Article 15, the 
prohibition against disability discrimination, or indeed other CRPD 
provisions, remains to be seen, but a full reading of the CRPD suggests 
that Article 8 (awareness-raising) advocacy is crucial in this area. In any 
event, sole reliance on Article 15 to found a claim regarding forced 
treatment would be a poor advocacy posture. In this context, IDA’s call 
for the research and promotion of “[b]etter practices for the elimination 
of restraint, seclusion and all forms of coercion in mental health 
 
 201. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Right, Communication No. 110/1981, ¶¶ 2.7, 14–15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/D/110/1981 
(Mar. 29, 1984); see also Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 63. Here, Nowak asserts that 
“[t]he more intrusive and irreversible the treatment, the greater the obligation on States to ensure 
that health professionals provide care to persons with disabilities only on the basis of their free 
and informed consent” and that, otherwise, medical interventions “may constitute torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.” Id. ¶ 59. 
 202. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 17. 
 203. Id. art. 19. 
 204. Id. art. 12. 
 205. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 65. 
 206. Id. ¶ 61. 
 207. Id. ¶¶ 64–65. 
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facilities and programs, the creation of a totally voluntary mental health 
system, and supportive approaches to meeting the needs of people in 
altered states of consciousness or mental health crises”208 is much 
needed. 
D.  Private Acts 
Also challenging are those instances in which acts amounting to 
torture or other ill-treatment are carried out by private individuals 
without any clear link to a State.209 There is sound authority for the 
proposition that torture may apply to private acts even absent the kind 
of close connection to the State suggested by the terms of CAT.210 Thus, 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stressed that the duty 
of the State to ensure protection against torture and other ill-treatment 
applies in respect to perpetrators “acting in their official capacity, 
outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.”211 The CRPD 
confers legitimacy on this understanding. The task is to identify the 
nature and scope of the duty on the part of States to ensure effective 
protection, including the parameters of the preventive duties associated 
with State responsibility for torture and other ill-treatment. Most 
relevant in these cases are instances of ill-treatment against people with 
disabilities within private facilities, such as hospitals, psychiatric 
institutions, nursing homes, retirement facilities, orphanages, 
rehabilitation centers, and drug-treatment centers.  
 
 208. See OPCAT Monitoring, supra note 165, ¶ 7. 
 209. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment on Article 7, has 
helped to articulate the content of the duty on the part of States in fulfilling its protective function. 
Effective protection in this regard entails the establishment of oversight mechanisms, including 
prompt investigation of complaints about torture and ill-treatment, responsibility on the part of 
torturers and the provision of effective domestic remedies, including compensation. Int’l 
Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, General Comment No. 7:  Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ¶ 1 (May 30, 1982), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28 
Symbol%29/7e9dbcf014061fa7c12563ed004804fa?Opendocument. 
 210. CAT Article 1 restricts the definition of torture to acts according to which “pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” CAT, supra note 24, art. 1. Nonetheless, it 
is well established that “consent and acquiescence by a public official clearly extends state 
obligations into the private sphere” and should likewise, in accordance with the clear intention of 
the drafters of the CPRD, “be interpreted to include state failure to protect persons within its 
jurisdiction from torture and ill-treatment committed by private individuals,” as so often such 
violence against persons with disabilities occurs in this sphere. Nowak Report, supra note 191, 
¶ 31. 
 211. CCPR General Comment No. 20, supra note 129, ¶ 2. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 184–244 (1993). 
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The drafters of the CRPD were keenly aware of the need for the 
obligations imposed by the Convention to extend to the prevention, 
punishment, and remedy of abuses inflicted against people with 
disabilities in private institutional settings by doctors, health 
professionals, social workers, and others working in private spheres.212 
Thus, the clear thrust of the proscription in Article 15 is that State 
responsibility extends well beyond the traditional setting of prisons and 
places of criminal detention to sites commonly associated with 
violations against the physical and mental integrity of disabled persons, 
a view that corresponds to that of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
the Committee against Torture.213 The proscriptions would also apply to 
interventions that occur in community settings outside the framework of 
modern medical facilities, such as community-based “curative” 
treatments (e.g., compulsory drinking of spring water to purge evil 
spirits).214 Likewise, Article 15 is applicable in cases of private violence 
where the State may be deemed to acquiesce, as in the case of 
maintaining civil laws that effectively strip persons with disabilities of 
their legal capacity and thus, their ability to protect themselves and to 
assert their rights in cases of violence (whether public or private).215 The 
maintenance of discriminatory laws may therefore serve to reinforce 
dependency, isolation, and vulnerability to violence.216 
 
 212. See, e.g., Mexico Working Paper on Convention, supra note 78, arts. 9, 13; Nowak 
Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 51; General Comment No. 2, supra note 26, ¶ 17. 
 213. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 51; General Comment No. 2, supra note 26, 
¶ 17. The Special Rapporteur stated that:  “the prohibition against torture related not only to 
public officials, such as law enforcement agents in the strictest sense, but may apply to doctors, 
health professionals, and social workers, including those working in private hospitals.” Nowak 
Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 51. Note, too, that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
found a private psychiatric hospital liable under international law in the Ximenes-Lopes case. 
Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 149 (July 4, 1996), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_149_ing.pdf. 
 214. See, e.g., Persons Living with Psychosocial Disabilities in Kenya, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/mental_disabilities_kenya.doc (last visited Oct. 15, 
2011). 
 215. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 69. 
 216. Cf. Nowak Report, supra note 191, ¶¶ 45–46 (discussing intimate partner violence and 
State acquiescence in domestic violence taking many forms); see A. v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 100/1997/884/1096 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view 
.asp?action=html&documentId=696109&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (holding that the U.K. had violated Article 3 in a 
case where a stepfather was acquitted by the English Court for repeatedly beating his stepson on a 
defense of “reasonable chastisement” and that “the failure to provide adequate protection 
constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the Convention,” id. ¶ 24.); Maria da Penha v. Brazil, 
Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. 
(2001) (The State was held responsible for failing to act with due diligence in a case where a 
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It will be a question of interpretation, however, as to what standard 
to apply to determine whether a State may be deemed in breach of its 
obligation to take preventive, punitive, or remedial action in such cases. 
Particularly egregious instances of State failure in this regard should 
incur State responsibility under the Convention. More difficult, 
however, may be forms of violence and abuse that are not perpetrated in 
institutional settings, but in other settings shielded from governmental 
scrutiny. States are nonetheless still obliged to vigorously investigate 
and prosecute where allegations in such contexts are well-founded.217 
E.  Punishment 
The violation of the Article 15 prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment gives rise to a somewhat different analysis 
insofar as all forms of punishment in some sense offend human 
dignity.218 As suggested by leading commentators, an element of 
reprehensible conduct must be present in order to trigger State 
responsibility in this context.219 In the view of the ECHR, the 
proscription implies that conduct must “go beyond that inevitable 
element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of 
legitimate treatment or punishment.”220 While violations in this sphere 
traditionally equate to violations against prisoners, it has broader 
application in the disability rights realm. 
As human rights tribunal jurisprudence already makes clear, the 
incidents of one’s lawful confinement in prison must be carefully 
scrutinized, necessitating an inquiry into the nature and conditions of 
 
woman suffered years of domestic abuse, leading to her permanent disability, and a lengthy 
fifteen year judicial investigation which was not concluded. The court reasoned, “discriminatory 
judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that is conducive to domestic violence, since society 
sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to take effective 
action to sanction such acts,” id. ¶ 56.). 
 217. See CAT, supra note 24, arts. 15, 4; see also CRPD, supra note 1, art. 16. 
 218. Thus, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has opined that imprisonment inevitably 
impairs the dignity of the prisoner. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 92–93, 
¶¶ 142–43 (S. Afr.). As noted in the leading commentary on the South Africa Bill of Rights, 
“[t]he circumstances in which prisoners are placed necessarily mean that they will have to tolerate 
greater limitations of their rights, including their right to dignity, than other persons. But any 
infringement of prisoners’ rights must be justifiable with reference to the objectives of placing 
them in prison:  that is the prevention of crime and the rehabilitation of the offender.” IAIN 
CURRIE & JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 276 (5th ed. 2005). 
 219. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 49. 
 220. Case of Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R 199, 223, ¶ 92 (2000). 
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punishment.221 Thus, the failure to provide reasonable accommodation 
to a prisoner with a disability will run afoul of the principle of non-
discrimination and, depending on the circumstances, may well 
constitute a violation of Article 15 of the CRPD. Likewise, poor 
conditions within other institutional settings will also be relevant under 
certain circumstances where conduct may be deemed punishment. 
In Huseyin Yildirim v. Turkey,222 the ECHR held that a violation of 
Article 3 had occurred in the case of a disabled prisoner who required 
extensive support. He had been left to the supervision of his cellmates in 
prison, and while in the prison hospital wing, to the supervision of his 
brother and two sisters. This continued for a period of three years in 
which he relied on them to feed, wash, dress, and perform other 
essential functions of everyday life. This, in the Court’s view, amounted 
to “degrading treatment” within the meaning of Article 3, though it 
could clearly have constituted degrading “punishment” as well.223 In 
Keenan v. United Kingdom,224 the ECHR found a violation of Article 3 
for a prisoner with a psycho-social disability who was confined to seven 
days isolation without effective monitoring or psychiatric evaluation. 
The prisoner killed himself during the isolation period.225 The Court 
held that punishment under these circumstances, which may have 
threatened the physical and moral resistance of the prisoner, was “not 
compatible with the standard of treatment required in respect of a 
mentally ill person.”226 
Beyond the prison setting, practices constituting punishment may 
occur in a myriad of other contexts, such as schools, homes, social care 
homes, and psychiatric institutions.227 Similarly, certain behavioral 
modification practices can fall within the Article 15 proscription.228 
Significantly for the purposes of interpreting the CRPD, treaty bodies 
and special procedures have consistently stated that any form of 
 
 221. See, e.g., Yildirim v. Turkey, App. No. 2778/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Engel v. Hungary, 
App. No. 46857/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 222. Yildrim v. Turkey, supra note 221, ¶ 59. 
 223. Id. ¶ 82. 
 224. Keenan v. the United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).  
 225. Id. ¶ 116. 
 226. Id. ¶ 115. 
 227. See MDRI ROTENBERG CENTER REPORT, supra note 22, at 28. 
 228. DRI has documented punishments practiced at a Massachusetts facility under the guise 
of “aversive treatments,” a particularly severe form of behavioral modification, and has put 
forward a compelling legal analysis of such practices which run afoul of international (and 
domestic) human rights law. See generally MDRI ROTENBERG CENTER REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 21–32. 
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corporal punishment is contrary to the prohibition of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.229 Practices of 
the kind documented in DRI’s report on the Judge Rotenberg Center in 
Massachusetts most clearly run afoul of Article 15 in this context.  
F.  State Duties to Protect 
The inclusion of paragraph 2 in Article 15 makes clear that the 
implementation of the provision obliges States Parties to do more than 
merely prohibit such conduct by means of domestic legislation. It 
requires States to “take all effective legislative, administrative, judicial 
or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on an equal basis 
with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”230 It thus imposes positive duties 
on the State to protect persons with disabilities against violations of 
Article 15(1). Reading Article 15(2) together with Article 4 (General 
Obligations), States Parties are required to take effective measures to 
respect, protect, and fulfill the right to be free from torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. This must include the 
obligation to undertake an effective investigation where an individual 
raises a claim of abuse.231 As Jan Fiala emphasizes, however, procedures 
are needed to ensure that domestic authorities will effectively and with 
due diligence investigate torture and other ill-treatment, an issue 
requiring further development given its lack of explication in the 
CRPD.232 State responsibility will attach with respect to Article 15 in 
cases where State authorities know or should know that abuse is taking 
place. Further, States have the obligation to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish non-State officials or private 
 
 229. See Nowak Interim Report, supra note 6, ¶ 40. 
 230. United Nations General Assembly, 61st Sess., supra note 67, art. 15. 
 231. See Assenov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 24760/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 652, 652, 654–55 
(1999) (holding that States must carry out an effective investigation where a person raises an 
arguable claim of an Article 3 violation by State agents, and that such investigation “should be 
capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible”). 
 232. See Jan Fiala, The Obligation to Investigate Torture of Persons with Disabilities:  The 
Way Forward 56 (2010) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law School) (on file with author) 
(underscoring that procedures “will therefore have to be developed by the opinions and general 
comments of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the body entrusted with 
interpreting it. The Committee should make the issue of effective investigation a high priority in 
order to give persons with disabilities an effective and timely remedy for the widespread 
violations they continue to suffer in many parts of the world”). 
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actors.233 Article 15 is likely to form the basis of communications 
submitted under the Optional Protocol to the CRPD,234 insofar as 
conditions within prisons and other institutional settings have long been 
the subject of scrutiny by disability organizations.235 The emergence of 
some ninety-four national human rights commissions around the 
world,236 along with many disability-specific NHRIs,237 should hopefully 
generate heightened scrutiny, thereby reinforcing State duties to protect 
against torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
G.  What Constitutes Prohibited Medical or Scientific Experimentation? 
The right to protection against medical or scientific human 
experimentation is a component of the protection against inhuman and 
degrading treatment under Article 7 of the ICCPR.238 Article 15 of 
CRPD, in line with the terms of Article 7 of the ICCPR, expressly 
prohibits medical or scientific experimentation on persons with 
disabilities without their free consent.239 The inclusion of this explicit 
provision in the ICCPR, representing an elaboration not included in the 
UDHR proscription against torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, has been traced to the interest of the 
drafters to account for the horrific forms of experimentation performed 
by Nazi doctors during the Holocaust. Such experimentation was based 
on bogus scientific and medical theories.240 Many of these experiments 
 
 233. See General Comment No. 2, supra note 26, ¶ 15; see also Fiala, supra note 232 
(describing the emergence of an international obligation to investigate ill-treatment, tracking its 
development under the European Convention, which requires States to effectively investigate all 
allegations of ill-treatment, and its particular implications for CRPD Article 16). 
 234. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 25. 
 235. The reports of DRI are particularly relevant in this regard. See MDRI reports, supra 
note 7. 
 236.  See Directory of Institutions, INT’L COORDINATING COMM. OF NAT’L INSTS. FOR THE 
PROMOTION AND PROT. OF HUM. RTS. (ICC), http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/National/DirectoryOf 
Institutions/Pages/default.aspx. 
 237. A specific role and responsibility for NHRIs is contemplated in Article 33(2) of the 
CRPD. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 33. 
 238. ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7. For discussion of the protections for research subjects 
under both the ICCPR and the MI Principles, see Eric Rosenthal, The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Rights of Research Subjects, in 4 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 
253, 253 (1996). 
 239. See CRPD, supra note 1, art 15. The only variation in the formulation is the more 
modern framing of “his or her” found in the CRPD. United Nations General Assembly, 61st 
Sess., supra note 67, art. 15 (emphasis added). 
 240. ICCPR commentators have noted the rationale for the inclusion of the language 
proscribing medical and scientific experimentation without informed consent. Twenty-three 
German physicians and administrators were criminally prosecuted by an American military 
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were performed on disabled persons.241 The application of this particular 
provision to persons with disabilities is featured in human rights 
commentaries, and it is not surprising that drafters of the CRPD early 
on during the negotiations referenced the importance of including 
such a provision.242 
The final expression of the prohibition against medical and 
scientific experimentation in the adopted Convention text appears as 
the second sentence of a single paragraph provision.243 As in the 
ICCPR formulation, Article 15 of the CRPD refers to impermissible 
medical or scientific experimentation. The text does not include the 
language “treatment,” proposed during the drafting process,244 and 
therefore should not be interpreted as constituting a blanket 
prohibition against any medical and scientific treatment per se in the 
absence of informed consent, a position that some disability 
advocates supported during the treaty negotiations to address, in 
particular, the coercive practice of administering psychiatric 
treatments (both of chemical and/or surgical variety).245 Moreover, 
the relationship of the second sentence of Article 15 to its first 
 
tribunal for their willing participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity, including 
medical experimentation against disabled persons. Sixteen of the accused were found guilty, and 
seven were sentenced to death. See 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
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Bernard M. Dickens et al., Research on Human Populations:  National and International Ethical 
Guidelines, 19 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 157, 157–58 (1991). 
 241. See HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, BY TRUST BETRAYED:  PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND 
THE LICENSE TO KILL IN THE THIRD REICH 53 (1995); DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES, 
FORGOTTEN CRIMES:  THE HOLOCAUST AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 27–29 (2001); ROBERT 
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253, 257 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2004); Oliver Lewis, Protecting the Rights of People with Mental 
Disabilities:  The European Convention on Human Rights, 9 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 293, 293 (2002). 
 242. For discussions of violations of human rights and of humanitarian law as factors causing 
disability, see DESPOUY, supra note 32, at 179–80; A Conceptual Framework, supra note 167, at 
85.  
 243. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 15, ¶ 1. The only difference in the final formulation of the 
prohibition to the language in the ICCPR is the addition of gender sensitive language—”or her”—
regarding the need for free consent. 
 244. See id.  
 245. See WNUSP Position, supra note 58. Such a prohibition would have had the 
consequence that any sort of treatment provided in the absence of informed consent would run 
afoul of the article, thereby creating considerable problems for a wide array of medical treatments 
provided in accordance with therapeutic necessity, including, of course, life-saving treatments in 
cases of medical emergencies. 
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sentence, particularly its extraction from its original placement as a 
second paragraph and insertion as the second sentence of the first 
paragraph, suggests that the provision targets a specific brand of ill-
treatment that itself constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading acts, namely coercive medical and scientific 
experimentation. This view is strongly supported by Nowak’s 
analysis of the travaux préparatoires of ICCPR Article 7.246 Thus, 
the specific prohibition against medical and scientific 
experimentation could not successfully be invoked to cover 
compulsory treatment according to standard medical protocol on the 
basis that such treatment does not constitute “experimentation,” but it 
could cover compulsory treatment that is non-standard and therefore 
experimental in nature, either of a medical drug or drug regimen, 
device, or procedure. This argument is missing from the existing 
discussion but should not be disregarded as a possible tool. To the 
extent that involuntary treatment is proscribed, it falls within the 
general prohibition and not within the terms of the medical 
experimentation prohibition. 
The question as to what practices might constitute 
“experimentation” is a difficult one. Courts will look to medical 
standards in order to assess whether a procedure is acceptable or not. 
In instances where novel and untested practices are unacceptable, 
they may be outlawed as experimentation. However, grounding a 
claim in the medical experimentation prohibition alone may be 
difficult with respect to a full range of practices which ostensibly 
appear to be experimental but have nonetheless received the 
imprimatur of legitimacy within the medical profession. Thus, in the 
absence of national medical protocols, it is doubtful whether cage 
beds, psychosurgery, or unmodified ECT could be considered 
“experimentation.” Such practices are, in any case, captured by the 
general prohibition as they most certainly do constitute “inhuman 
treatment,” prohibited by the first sentence of Article 15 which does 
not hinge upon violating a medical standard. Practices prohibited 
under the “experimentation” prohibition are those falling outside of 
national psychiatric (and other medical) protocols, or practices for 
which the World Psychiatric Association (or other medical body) 
 
 246. See NOWAK, supra note 25, at 139. 
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issued a protocol and they are outside of it. An example could be the 
trial of new psychiatric drugs on residents of social care homes in the 
Czech Republic without their knowledge and consent,247 or certain 
behavioral aversive techniques of the kind reported on by DRI in its 
report on the practices of the Judge Rotenberg Center in 
Massachusetts. 
In this regard, the MI Principles, though outdated and highly 
problematic in many respects, are relevant as a guide to the 
interpretation of CRPD, insofar as they provide clear authority for the 
prohibition of psychosurgery and other irreversible and highly dubious 
treatments on involuntary subjects.248 This protection is essential given 
that the drafters of the CRPD were unwilling to address these issues 
with any degree of specificity and in the light of ongoing and persistent 
egregious abuses across the world perpetuated against persons with 
psycho-social disabilities under the guise of “therapeutic treatment” or 
“cure.” 
H.  Article 15 as a (Re)invigorated Informed Consent Regime? 
The prohibition of medical and scientific experimentation in the 
absence of informed consent is likewise relevant in the context of 
certain diseases that cause disabling conditions and in respect of which 
medical science offers no cure, but which are the subject of research and 
experimentation.249 In this context, the interpretive challenge for the 
CRPD treaty-monitoring body is considerable, particularly given the 
difficulty of clearly differentiating between treatment and 
experimentation in such contexts. The danger of conflating treatment 
and experimentation on human subjects—particularly in the case of 
treating those with terminal illnesses such as cancer or AIDS—is real 
and must be a core concern of those charged with interpreting Article 
15. In the specific context of disability, offering (or coercively 
administering) a regimen of various drugs or therapies that in their 
combination are unproven in their medical efficacy gives rise to 
questions about differentiating between that which is experimental in 
nature and that which legitimately constitutes therapeutic treatment.  
 
 247. See Fiala, supra note 232, at 56. 
 248. See MI Principles, supra note 51, principle 11, ¶ 14. Insofar as the CRPD does not 
explicitly address psycho-surgery, the MI Principles are an essential repository of standards that, 
in the absence of more specific guidelines articulated by the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, must be accorded due weight and interpretive value.  
 249. See A Conceptual Framework, supra note 167, at 84. 
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Of particular importance is the interpretation of Article 15, 
together with Article 3 (General Principles)250 and Article 12 (Equal 
recognition before the law),251 which give primacy, respectively, to the 
principles of informed consent, non-discrimination, autonomy, and 
participation in decision-making and the presumption of legal capacity 
combined with a framework for supported decision-making. In the 
context of medical and scientific experimentation, the principles of non-
discrimination, autonomy, and participation set forth in the CRPD 
strongly support a view contrary to that held by Nowak in his 
commentary on the ICCPR proscribing only treatment or 
experimentation without consent where the effects amount to degrading 
or inhuman treatment. At the core of the Convention and reflected in the 
Nuremberg Code is the notion that medical and scientific 
experimentation without consent itself constitutes a degradation of 
human dignity and an affront to individual autonomy, irrespective of the 
harmful effects of such experimentation or treatment.252 Such conduct 
rejects the agency of the rights-holder, treating him/her as an object on 
which to act, as opposed to a subject and holder of rights.253 The 
Nuremberg Code admits of no limitation, restriction, or exception.254 
Respect for autonomy as dictated by the Convention, as well as the 
principle of participation in decision-making, requires an informed 
consent process that is forthright and free of deceptive exploitation. It 
will be the role of the CRPD Committee to clarify the essential 
requirements of the informed consent process, not only with respect to 
the prohibition against medical and scientific experimentation in Article 
15, but also in respect of all other medical interventions or services, 
such as those falling under the general right to health and rehabilitation 
provisions.255 Accordingly, it will fall to the interpreters of the CRPD to 
discern with care whether a particular intervention is experimental in 
nature and, if so, whether the strict requirements of informed consent 
 
 250. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 3.  
 251. Id. art. 12.  
 252. See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
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 254. See 2 TRIALS OF WAR, supra note 252, at 181. 
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within the framework of supported decision-making proffered by the 
CRPD are met. 
Finally, consistent with the foregoing discussions regarding 
informed consent, the CRPD must be regarded as going beyond the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ECHRB), 
which recognizes exceptions to the prohibition against research and 
experimentation absent consent in certain circumstances.256 The drafters 
of the CRPD adopted the approach taken in the ICCPR, maintaining a 
strict prohibition against scientific experimentation absent informed 
consent, as opposed to the approach taken in the ECHRB. This is the 
better view and one that corresponds to the original regime outlined in 
the Nuremberg Code257 and springs from the egregious cases of medical 
experimentation perpetrated against persons with disabilities during the 
Holocaust, which unfortunately have modern manifestations.  
VI.  ENGENDERING THE CRPD ANTI-TORTURE FRAMEWORK 
The drafters of the CRPD were concerned with the need to address 
the specific experiences of women and girls with disabilities within the 
framework of the rights articulated in the Convention. In this regard, 
Article 15 must be understood in the light of its gender implications and 
interpreted by reference to, among others, Article 6 (Women with 
Disabilities),258 as well as Article 3 (General Principles), which 
recognizes “[e]quality between men and women” as a general principle 
of the CRPD.259 
The prohibition against torture and other forms of violence often 
takes on a particular form when perpetrated against women and girls 
generally, and this may be even more pronounced for women and girls 
with disabilities.260 Conditions within institutions may pose specific 
threats to women and girls. The threat of gender-based violence faced 
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by women and girls in institutional settings has been well-documented261 
and persons with disabilities—both men and women—are up to three 
times more likely to be victims of physical and sexual abuse and rape.262 
This gender-based violence includes acts committed at the hands of 
family members and caregivers, dimensions which will be important 
factors to consider in the context of interpreting Article 15.263 Moreover, 
rape and other sexual violence is always cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
and in certain circumstances will constitute torture as well as breaches 
of other rules of international law, including war crimes.264 As noted by 
the Special Rapporteur on Torture, “rape constitutes torture when it is 
carried out by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of public officials.”265 
The Human Rights Committee has referenced both forced abortion 
and involuntary sterilization as violations of Article 7 of the ICCPR,266 
and such practices would also trigger violations of Article 15 of the 
CRPD.267 The Special Rapporteur has noted that “given the particular 
vulnerability of women with disabilities, forced abortions and 
sterilizations of these women if they are the result of a lawful process by 
which decisions are made by their ‘legal guardians’ against their will, 
may constitute torture or ill-treatment.”268 The better view, however, and 
one consistent with Article 12 of the Convention269 and its framework of 
supported decision-making, is that such practices must be presumed to 
fall afoul of Article 15 absent free and informed consent. Finally, the 
failure to take the particular needs of women and girls with disabilities 
into account when in prison, detention, or otherwise in a controlled 
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setting in terms of reproductive health care, family contact, hygiene, and 
the like is central to ensuring compliance with Article 15, as well as 
Article 6, of the CRPD. 
The implementation of Article 15 puts States under an obligation 
to include a gender dimension in their reporting to the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.270 As a component of their reporting 
obligations, States must include measures they have undertaken to 
investigate and prosecute allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment or punishment against women and girls as well as 
measures implemented to provide effective remedies to victims.271 The 
obligation to respect mandates that States undertake measures to ensure 
that women and girls with disabilities are protected from such abuse, 
which would entail, among other things, effective training of police, 
prison officials, caregivers, and medical personnel, all of whom will 
have responsibility for ensuring the protection of persons with 
disabilities in various custodial settings. 
VII.  EXPULSION AND EXTRADITION 
The Convention makes no reference to the right of persons with 
disabilities to seek asylum nor does it make reference to the principle of 
non-refoulement, the obligation not to return a person to a State where 
he or she is likely to be subjected to torture.272 Authoritative 
interpretations of the prohibition against torture do provide guidance as 
to the interaction of Article 15 of the CRPD and expulsion, deportation, 
extradition, and related procedures.273 
The Committee against Torture has opined that deporting or 
extraditing a person to a country where he or she is likely to face torture 
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or ill-treatment may constitute a violation of Article 3 of ICCPR.274 The 
Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment on Article 7, 
emphasized that “[s]tates parties must not expose individuals to the 
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, 
expulsion or refoulement.”275 Gender-based aspects are of key relevance 
to any analysis, including the risk of gender-based violence which may 
aggravate existing disabilities or result in secondary disabilities.276  
The jurisprudence of the ECHR supports the view that a State may 
breach its obligation under the torture prohibition of the European 
Convention if it expels or extradites an individual to another State in 
circumstances facilitative of torture or inhuman treatment.277 
Particularly relevant to understanding the impact of Article 15 on 
expulsion and extradition cases is the decision in D. v. United 
Kingdom.278 There, the ECHR held that the deportation order of a man 
in advanced stages of AIDS to his home in St. Kitts constituted inhuman 
treatment on the basis of substandard medical resources accessible to 
him there.279 In Bensaid v. United Kingdom, however, the ECHR found 
no violation of the (Article 3) prohibition where an Algerian national 
due to be deported complained that deportation would violate his rights 
on the basis that he would receive no psychiatric medication for his 
mental illness.280 Similarly, the ECHR in Salkic v. Sweden281 held 
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inadmissible a case alleging a breach of Articles 2 and 3 on the basis 
that Sweden’s expulsion order following the denial of refugee status 
would cause irreparable damage to the applicant’s entire family on 
account of their poor mental health and inadequacy of treatment in 
Bosnia.282 There, the Court stated that people subject to expulsion 
cannot claim an entitlement to remain in the territory in order to benefit 
from medical, social, or other forms of assistance.283 However, the 
Court left open the possibility that, in exceptional circumstances, 
humanitarian circumstances may trigger an Article 3 violation and 
justify the overruling of an expulsion order.284 
Placed within the context of the Convention, one may conclude 
that it is impermissible under Article 15 for a State to return persons 
with disabilities to a country where they would likely experience 
conduct amounting to torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment on the basis of their disability. More specifically, for 
example, a violation would clearly occur if a person with a psycho-
social disability was returned to a country where he or she would face 
involuntary treatment, such as psycho-surgery, forced ingestion of 
poison, or an equivalent customary or bogus medical practice.285 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The adoption of the CRPD clearly constitutes an important 
development in the anti-torture framework under international human 
rights law. Its principal contribution is to apply the torture prohibition 
within a disability context, consistent with core principles of the CRPD 
including dignity, non-discrimination, autonomy, and independence.286 
It also contributes to the framework by introducing explicitly, for the 
first time in an international human rights treaty, the requirement that 
reasonable accommodations be provided and that the failure to do so 
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results in a finding of discrimination.287 As implicitly recognized in 
cases before the ECHR,288 the CRPD makes clear that the duty to 
accommodate is part of the non-discrimination and equality framework 
and is thus applicable to persons detained or imprisoned.289 These 
principles add content to the overall anti-torture framework and should 
thus find ready application as a guide to regional and international 
regimes applying the prohibition against torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment.  
That said, the CRPD does little in Article 15 (or Article 17) other 
than codify existing human rights law and create the need for a complex 
and more nuanced application of CRPD principles and provisions. The 
ostensible consensus around Article 15 represented in the adopted text 
masks significant disagreement, particularly in the area of forced 
treatment.290 It is likewise a decidedly weak framework from which to 
tackle involuntary institutionalization, and its relationship in that regard 
to Article 14 is unclear.291 Other questions remain about the reading of 
Article 15 in the context of other key provisions of the CRPD, as the 
reservations and declarative interpretations entered by States reveal. 
Following Andrew Byrnes and other commentators, in some instances 
human rights treaties can do little more than draw suggestive 
boundaries, leaving the precise contours of the obligation to evolve over 
time.292  
Returning to constructivist accounts of human rights law-
making,293 the contextualized meaning of Article 15—the application of 
the torture prohibition to disability is, at least in part, a work in 
progress. As noted in this article, certain components of the CRPD 
contextual regime are unsettled and have not yet given rise to the level 
of mutual confidence and shared understanding that have coalesced in 
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respect of other obligations.294 As Kayess and French emphasize in their 
superb analysis of the CRPD, “some crucial areas, including bioethics 
and compulsory treatment, are barely grazed by the CRPD text” and 
“[s]ome disability rights issues still remain untouched or undeveloped in 
international human rights law.”295 In a similar vein, Fiala points to the 
need for procedural development of the duty to investigate torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment as a priority for the CRPD Committee (or 
other treaty bodies such as CAT) as the CRPD text is scant on details 
regarding the duty to investigate.296 
In this sense, therefore, the CRPD mechanisms and other United 
Nations human rights and regional institutional arrangements assume 
special significance. They should be seen as generators of the 
continuing CRPD law making process, offering opportunities to foster 
shared meaning around the disability rights set forth in the Convention. 
The institutional arrangements created by the CRPD, including its 
potentially innovative periodic Conference of States Parties and the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,297 along with 
those that will be implicated by it, such as existing treaty bodies (e.g., 
the CAT Committee), regional human rights systems and national 
human rights commissions, are important sites of advocacy and can 
foster shared understanding, bearing in mind the educative and 
constitutive effects of such processes.298 The CRPD, then, is a “living 
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treaty regime”299 and a site for the further development and enrichment 
of the anti-torture regime, generally, and disability rights relating to 
physical and mental integrity, in particular. 
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